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"GIVE ME YOUR TIRED, YOUR POOR,"
YOUR COLLATERALLY ESTOPPED MASSES?
GUILTY PLEAS AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
OF ALIENAGE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS:
UNITED STATES v. GALLARDO-MENDEZ
I.

INTRODUCTION

The doctrine of collateral estoppel provides that the determination of
an issue of ultimate fact by a valid judgment precludes the relitigation of1
that issue in a subsequent action between those parties or their privies.
Although civil litigants most frequently use the doctrine, the United States
Supreme Court has allowed criminal defendants to invoke collateral estoppel against the state since 1916.2 The constitutionality of the prosecution's use of collateral estoppel against criminal defendants, however, has3
engendered a long-standing circuit split that the Court has yet to resolve.
This Note considers whether federal courts may use guilty pleas in
previous criminal proceedings to collaterally estop criminal defendants in
subsequent criminal proceedings. First, Part II catalogues the reasoning
of the circuits and commentators that have considered this question. 4 Sec5
ond, Part III summarizes the facts of United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, a

recent federal case that ruled on this issue. 6 Third, Part IV identifies the
many factors considered by the Gallardo-Mendez court. 7 Part IV also critiques the court's analysis and suggests that the Gallardo-Mendez decision
properly subordinated public policy concerns to the constitutional man1. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 261 (6th ed. 1990). Another definition states
that a "prior judgment between [the] same parties on [a] different cause of action
is an estoppel as to those matters in issue or points controverted, on determination
of which finding or verdict was rendered." Id. For a further discussion of the
elements of collateral estoppel, see infra note 10 and accompanying text.
2. See United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 86 (1916) (allowing defensive collateral estoppel in federal criminal case);J. VAN FLEET, RESJUDICATA § 628,
at 1242 (1895) (stating that no reason exists why collateral estoppel should not

apply in criminal case), cited in Allan D. Vestal, Issue Preclusion and CriminalProsecutions, 65 IowA L. REv. 281, 319 (1980).

3. For a discussion of the circuit split on this issue, see infra note 16 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of the background of this issue, see infra notes 10-60 and
accompanying text.
5. 150 F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1998).
6. See id. at 1240 (considering collateral estoppel of accused). For a discussion of the facts of Gallardo-Mendez, see infra notes 61-85 and accompanying text.
7. For a narrative of the Gallardo-Mendez court's analysis, see infra notes 86-99

and accompanying text.

(671)
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dates implicit in the Sixth Amendment. 8 Finally, Part V discusses the impact of Gallardo-Mendez on federal courts and suggests that a constitutional
prohibition of collateral estoppel of criminal defendants would establish a
bright-line rule binding on both federal and state courts. 9
II.
A.

BACKGROUND

CollateralEstoppel in Criminal Cases

A common definition of collateral estoppel states, "When an issue of
fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on
the same or a different claim."10 Collateral estoppel constitutes a narrow
application of the broader concept of res judicata, which bars relitigation
of the same cause of action between the same parties.1 1 Traditional justifi8. For a critical analysis of whether pleading guilty to illegal alienage will act
as collateral estoppel in subsequent criminal proceedings, see infra notes 100-65
and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the impact of the Gallardo-Mendez decision on federal
courts, see infra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; 18JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE, § 132.01 [2] (3d
ed. 1998); see Hoag v. NewJersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470 (1958) (stating that doctrine of
collateral estoppel provides that where question of fact essential to judgment is
actually litigated and determined by valid and final judgment, determination is
conclusive between parties in subsequent action on different cause of action), overruled in part by Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970); Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 569 (1951) (noting that estoppel extends only to
questions put distinctly in issue, directly determined and necessarily decided by
earlier adjudication); WARREN FREEDMAN, RESJUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL:
TOOLS FOR PLAINTIrFS AND DEFENDANTS 2 (1988) (cataloguing classic elements of
collateral estoppel doctrine); 18 MoORE ET AL., supra, § 132.03 (stating that collateral estoppel requires: (1) sameness of issues; (2) that issue have been raised, litigated and adjudged in earlier proceeding; (3) that issue was material and relevant
to disposition of prior action; and (4) that determination was necessary and essential to prior judgment); Note, Collateral and Equitable Estoppel of Federal CriminalDefendants, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 1221, 1221-22 (1976) [hereinafter Collateral and
Equitable Estoppel] (stating that collateral estoppel originated in civil litigation to
avoid retrial of issues of fact necessarily litigated in prior actions between same
parties). Some courts and authors refer to collateral estoppel with the more descriptive term "issue preclusion." See, e.g., Vestal, supra note 2, at 281 n.3 (stating
that American Law Institute, courts and commentators use term "issue preclusion,"
which provides more precision than "collateral estoppel").
11. See, e.g., Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 786 (9th Cir.
1968) (discussing relation of collateral estoppel to resjudicata); 18 MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 10, § 132.01 [4] [a] (comparing collateral estoppel to broader but closely

related doctrine of res judicata). One common definition calls res judicata the
rule that "a final judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the

merits is conclusive ... and.., constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action
involving the same claim, demand or cause of action." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY,
supra note 1, at 1305. Collateral estoppel is narrower than resjudicata in that res
judicata bars the relitigation of the same cause of action between the same parties,
whereas collateral estoppel bars relitigation of a particular issue or determinative
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cations for collateral estoppel include promoting judicial economy, preserving judicial and litigant resources, protecting the parties from
2
harassment and providing them with a sense of finality'
Federal courts differentiate between offensive collateral estoppel by
the plaintiff and defensive collateral estoppel by the defendant.' 3 In federal criminal cases, the use of the collateral estoppel doctrine has, until
recently, remained the province of the defendant. 14 In fact, the Court
fact being litigated. See id. at 1306. Some commentators have noted that resjudicata is obligatory while collateral estoppel is discretionary, because the former
stems from the need to provide conclusiveness to judgments, while the latter primarily serves judicial economy. See FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 4-5 (suggesting
that purpose of promoting judicial economy does not require application of collateral estoppel).
12. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979) (stating that collateral estoppel protects adversaries from "expense and vexation" and conserves judicial resources); FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 32 (noting that many believe collateral
estoppel invariably saves judicial and litigant resources and prevents harassment of
parties to previous litigation); 18 MOORE ET AL., supra note 10, § 132.01 [3] (noting
that courts use collateral estoppel to promote judicial economy and prevent judicial embarrassment caused by inconsistent decisions); ALLAN D. VESTAL, RES JUDICATA/PRECLUSION v-8 to v-12 (1969) (stating that collateral estoppel establishes
rights of individuals, prevents harassment, encourages efficient use of courts and
promotes prestige of courts created by comity between different courts); 18
CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403, at 11-22
(1981) (stating that collateral estoppel promotes certainty, consistency of judgment, judicial stability, judicial and litigant economy, finality of judgments and
moral force of judgments); Anne B. Poulin, Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases:
Reuse of Evidence After Acquittal, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 16-19 (1989) (noting that
collateral estoppel provides finality of judgments, prevents unfair prosecutorial
harassment and preserves parties' resources); Collateraland Equitable Estoppe, supra
note 10, at 1221 (calling collateral estoppel "a rule of efficiency or convenience"
developed to avoid unnecessary relitigation of facts); Note, CollateralEstoppel in
Criminal Cases-A Supplement to the Double Jeopardy Protection, 21 RUTGERS L. REv.
274, 295 (1967) [hereinafter CollateralEstoppel in Criminal Cases] (stating that common justifications for collateral estoppel include conservation of public funds and
judicial resources); Christopher Murray, Note, CollateralEstoppel in CriminalProsecutions: Time to Abandon the Identity of Parties Rule, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 922, 925 (1973)
(stating that collateral estoppel eliminates expense, vexation, waste and inconsistent duplicative litigation).
13. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.4 (1979) (stating
that plaintiff uses offensive collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of issues previously lost by defendant against another plaintiff, while defendant uses defensive
collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation by plaintiff of issues previously lost
against another defendant); FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 31 (stating that offensive
collateral estoppel occurs when party or non-party seeks to assert collateral estoppel as "sword" against defendant who lost prior judgment, while defensive collateral estoppel occurs where defendant uses prior judgment as "shield" against
plaintiff who had been party to earlier suit); 18 MoORE ET AL., supra note 10,
§ 132.04[2] [c] [i] (comparing offensive and defensive collateral estoppel in federal
litigation); Collateral and Equitable Estoppe4 supra note 10, at 1222, 1222n.11 (suggesting distinction between collateral estoppel of government after acquittal and
collateral estoppel of defendant following conviction).
14. See Pena-Cabanillas,394 F.2d at 787 (stating that criminal cases most frequently involve defensive collateral estoppel); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12,
§ 4474, at 747 (noting that collateral estoppel is most commonly applied in crimi-
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recognizes the criminal defendant's use of defensive collateral estoppel
against the state as being "embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy."15 Whether federal courts may use collateral
estoppel against criminal defendants, however, has engendered a clear circuit split. 1 6 Although the Gallardo-Mendez decision limited its holding to
guilty pleas as a source of estoppel, much of the case law in this area con17
siders estoppel of the accused generally.
nal cases by defendants); Poulin, supra note 12, at 1 (stating that criminal cases
usually involve defensive application of collateral estoppel); E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of Doctrine of ResJudicata in Criminal Cases, 9 A.L.R. 3d 203, 241
(1966 & Supp. 1993) (same). Federal courts have long recognized the propriety of
defensive collateral estoppel in criminal cases. See generally Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443-44
(allowing defensive collateral estoppel in criminal case); Sealfon v. United States,
332 U.S. 575 (1948) (same); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916)
(same); Hernandez v. United States, 370 F.2d 171 (9th Cir. 1966) (same); Adams v.
United States, 287 F.2d 701 (5th Cir. 1961) (same); Wheatley v. United States, 286
F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1961) (same); United States v. Kaadt, 171 F.2d 600 (7th Cir.
1948) (same).
15. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-46; see 24JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE, § 611.20[1] (3d ed. 1998) (citing Ashe for proposition that doctrine of
collateral estoppel is embodied in Fifth Amendment protection against double
jeopardy). Some courts, however, state that the defensive use of collateral estoppel
in criminal cases differs in scope from the double jeopardy defense. See United
States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 634 (11 th Cir. 1992) (stating that double jeopardy
prohibits prosecution of crime itself, whereas collateral estoppel forbids only relitigation of certain facts of crime); Ferenc v. Dugger, 867 F.2d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir.
1989) (stating that double jeopardy prohibits prosecution of crime itself, whereas
collateral estoppel simply forbids government from relitigating certain facts).
16. Compare United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir.
1998) (rejecting government's use of offensive collateral estoppel against accused), United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 892-93 (3d Cir. 1994) (same), and
Harnage,976 F.2d at 636 (same), with Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d
20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975) (allowing government's use of offensive collateral estoppel
against accused), and Pena-Cabanillas,394 F.2d at 785, 788 (same). The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, noting the surprising dearth of
case law, refused to tackle the issue. See United States v. Ping, 555 F.2d 1069, 1076
(2d Cir. 1977) (deciding not to reach "the more difficult issue of whether collateral estoppel can ever be invoked by the government in a criminal case"). The
confusion in this area of the law makes the Second Circuit's refusal understandable. See United States v. Larkin, 605 F.2d 1360, 1361 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that
collateral estoppel involves arcane principles that defy bright-letter definition, and
that "one entering this field must do so with trepidation"), opinion withdrawn in part
on reh'gby United States v. Larkin, 611 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1980). The United States
Supreme Court also avoided addressing the issue, leaving the circuit split unresolved. But see Ashe, 397 U.S. at 464-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[C] ourts that
have applied the collateral-estoppel concept to criminal actions would certainly
not apply it to both parties, as is true in civil cases ....");Frank v. Magnum, 237
U.S. 309, 334 (1915) (dictum) (stating that principle of collateral estoppel is as
applicable to criminal cases as to civil cases).
17. See Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1243 (stating that facts of case required
court to consider only whether guilty pleas may act as collateral estoppel in subsequent criminal proceedings). Most of the circuits confronted with this issue addressed the propriety of the government's use of collateral estoppel in general,
rather than limiting their holdings as the Gallardo-Mendez court did. Compare id.
(limiting analysis to guilty pleas as basis of collateral estoppel), and Hernandez-Uribe,
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1.

The Broad Issue: Estoppel of the Accused Generally

Allowing CollateralEstoppel

Two illegal alienage cases, Hernandez-Uribev. United States18 and PenaCabanillasv. United States,19 forced the United States Courts of Appeals for
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, respectively, to first consider whether fed20
Both circuits
eral courts may collaterally estop criminal defendants.
adopted the policy arguments offered by the United States District Court
21
for the Southern District of California in United States v. Rangel-Perez.
The Rangel-Perez court stated that wise public policy and common sense
judicial administration combine to advocate allowing the government to
collaterally estop criminal defendants. 2 2 Relying heavily on the govern515 F.2d at 22 (considering collateral estoppel based on guilty pleas), with Pellulo,
14 F.3d at 896 (addressing collateral estoppel of accused in general), Harnage,976
F.2d at 634 (examining use of collateral estoppel generally), and Pena-Cabanillas,
394 F.2d at 787-88 (considering whether prior judgment in criminal case should
collaterally estop criminal defendants generally).
18. 515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1975).
19. 394 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1968).
20. See, e.g., VESTAL, supra note 12, at v-364 to 365 (citing dearth of cases
before Pena-Cabanillasconcerning collateral estoppel of criminal defendant);
Comment, The Use of CollateralEstoppel Against the Accused, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 515,
519 (1969) [hereinafter CollateralEstoppel Against the Accused] (stating that United
States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619 (D.C. Cal. 1959), upon which HernandezUribe and Pena-Cabanillasrelied, invoked novel doctrine in federal court). In Hernandez-Uribe, a jury convicted the defendant of reentering the United States. See
515 F.2d at 20-21; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994) (criminalizing repeated illegal
entry). The defendant appealed his conviction, urging that the lower court erred
in instructing the jury that a guilty plea some years earlier had a binding effect on
the defendant in the instant proceeding. See Hernandez-Uribe, 515 F.2d at 20-21.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the conviction,
finding no error in permitting the government to collaterally estop the defendant.
See id.
In Pena-Cabanillas,ajury convicted the defendant of falsely and willfully representing himself as a citizen of the United States. See Pena-Cabanillas,394 F.2d at
786; see also 18 U.S.C. § 911 (1994) (criminalizing false representation of one's
citizenship). The defendant's status as an illegal alien constituted an essential element of that crime. See Pena-Cabanillas,394 F.2d at 786. After a subsequent indictment for illegally re-entering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the
government sought to collaterally estop the defendant from relitigating his alienage. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the
government could collaterally estop the defendant, finding no error in the application of collateral estoppel against him. See id.
21. 179 F. Supp. 619 (D.C. Cal. 1959). In Rangel-Perez, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California used the defendant's prior conviction for illegal entry as collateral estoppel of the defendant's alienage after his
illegal re-entry into the United States. See id. at 628-29. The Eighth and Ninth
Circuits based much of their reasoning in favor of the government's collaterally
estopping criminal defendants upon the policy arguments expressed in Rangel-Perez. See Pena-Cabanillas,394 F.2d at 787-88 (adopting arguments of Rangel-Perez);
Hernandez-Uibe, 515 F.2d at 21-22 (same).
22. See Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. at 625 ("The wise public policy underlying
the doctrine [of collateral estoppel], and common-sense judicial administration as
well, combine to advocate application of collateral estoppel against a defendant in
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ment's need to deter illegal immigration, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
concluded that allowing illegal aliens to continually relitigate their alienage would undermine the legislative intent behind prophylactic immigra-

tion statutes.2 3 These circuits agreed with the Rangel-Perez court's
conclusion that "a defendant would have an added incentive to enter
again and again, knowing that a trial de novo on the issue of alienage
would be forthcoming and that such trial might, on one occasion, result in
a favorable verdict .... -24 Thus, their decisions relied on the traditional
25
justification for collateral estoppel-judicial economy.
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits did not rest solely on the judicial economy argument. 26 The Ninth Circuit in Pena-Cabanillassuggested that
courts should, as in civil cases, allow mutuality of estoppel by both parties-the defendant and the state. 2 7 Indeed, because the defendant may
a criminal case ....). Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits considered the RangelPerez court's policy arguments persuasive. See Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 22 ("We
find such reasoning to be persuasive."); Pena-Cabanillas,394 F.2d at 787 (adopting
reasoning of "well written" Rangel-Perez decision); see also United States v. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d 1, 5 (9th Cir. 1975) (describing Rangel-Perez decision as "athorough analysis of relevant case law").
23. See Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 21-22 (suggesting that relitigation of issue
would weaken federal statutes' deterrent effect on future illegal entries); PenaCabanillas, 394 F.2d at 787-88 (stating that relitigation of alienage issue would undermine accomplishment of purposes of federal immigration laws); see also RangelPerez, 179 F. Supp. at 626 (same).
24. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. at 626 (suggesting that "[i]f the issue of alienage
were to be tried each time a defendant makes an entry into the United States, after
once having been found by judicial determination to be an alien, there would be
less to deter future entries than at the present"); see Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 22
(adopting Rangel-Perez court's reasoning); Pena-Cabanillas,394 F.2d at 787 (stating
that relitigation of alienage would undermine federal immigration laws).
25. See Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 21-22 (citing need to deter future illegal
entries and increased litigation); Pena-Cabanillas,394 F.2d at 787-88 (relying on
policy of promoting judicial administration); see also Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. at
625 (stating that need to prevent infinite defenses by accused is "sound public
policy" that would foreclose litigation of given subject matter once parties have
had full and fair hearing and adjudication of issue). This reliance on judicial
economy makes sense in light of the traditional policy considerations justifying
application of the doctrine. See, e.g.,
18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 4403, at 1122 (stating that collateral estoppel promotes judicial and litigant economy).
26. See Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 22 (noting that federal decisions instruct
courts to apply collateral estoppel in criminal cases with "realism and rationality"
(quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970)); Pena-Cabanillas,394 F.2d at
787 (suggesting that mutuality of estoppel applies in both criminal and civil cases).
27. See Pena-Cabanillas,394 F.2d at 787 (agreeing with "well written" RangelPerez decision that collateral estoppel "is closely connected with the question of
whether the doctrine is to be applied with the same mutuality in criminal cases as it
is in civil cases, to-wit, in favor of and against both the plaintiff and defendant"); see
also Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. at 625 (stating that wise public policy and common
sense judicial administration combine to advocate same mutuality of collateral estoppel in criminal as in civil cases). But see United States v. Ping, 555 F.2d 1069,
1076 (2d Cir. 1977) (dictum) (disagreeing with government's argument that logic
and fairness mandate that collateral estoppel be mutual even in criminal cases);
CollateralEstoppel in Criminal Cases, supra note 12, at 276-78 (suggesting that reci-
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collaterally estop the prosecution, one commentator wrote that, "in terms
of ordinary [estoppel] principles, it would seem natural and logical to al28
low the government to use [collateral estoppel] to its advantage as well."
Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits also stated that collateral estoppel of
the accused does not substantially encroach upon the defendant's due
process guarantees because the defendant may contest the propriety of
the prior criminal proceeding or argue that the alienage status has since
29
changed.
Courts and commentators support collateral estoppel of the accused
on other grounds as well. For example, commentators suggest that collateral estoppel of the accused does not conflict with the Confrontation
Clause because the defendant already had an opportunity to confront the
adverse witnesses in the prior criminal proceeding. 30 The Rangel-Perez
procity of estoppel "isinapposite in criminal prosecutions" because due process
requires that defendant be guaranteed trial as to each element of fact in every
prosecution).
28. Richard B. Kennelly, Jr., Note, Precluding the Accused: Offensive Collateral
Estoppel in Criminal Cases, 80 VA. L. REv. 1379, 1397 (1994). This statement finds
support in the fact that both parties to a civil case may use collateral estoppel and
that the Ashe court did not expressly forbid collateral estoppel of the accused. See
id. (noting mutuality of estoppel in civil cases and limited scope of Ashe decision).
Kennelly also rejected then Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Ashe, calling it "erroneous" and "flawed." Compare id. at 1398-99 ("Chief Justice Burger's dictum in
dissent regarding collateral estoppel rested on flawed or since outdated assumptions, and presents no serious obstacle to allowing offensive use of [collateral estoppel] by the government in criminal cases."), with Ashe, 397 U.S. at 464-65
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[C]ourts that have applied the collateral-estoppel concept to criminal actions would certainly not apply it to both parties, as is true in
civil cases . . . ."). Kennelly then pointed out that the district court had already
used collateral estoppel against a criminal defendant before the Ashe decision and
that Burger wrote his dissent nine years before the Court recognized offensive collateral estoppel in civil cases. See Kennelly, supra, at 1398-99 (noting that RangelPerez court allowed collateral estoppel of accused long before Ashe decision, which
was nine years before Court endorsed offensive collateral estoppel in civil cases in
ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 332-33 (1979) (permitting offensive collateral estoppel in federal civil cases)).
29. See Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 22 (noting that defendant may always examine whether prior adjudication was made after full and adequate hearing and
was essential to determination of case); Pena-Cabanillas,394 F.2d at 787-88 (same);
Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. at 626 (stating that, "beyond question," accused is always
entitled to have any prior proceedings carefully scrutinized); see also Pena-Cabanillas, 394 F.2d at 786 (stating that defendant would be allowed to litigate possible
change in alien status since earlier adjudication); Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. at 626
(noting that estoppel of accused is not absolute because alien may have facts of
entry tried anew, as well as its justification on other grounds); Kennelly, supra note
28, at 1410-12 (suggesting that collateral estoppel of accused does not violate abstract due process rights because "'it is a wholly fallacious idea that a judge's sense
of what is fundamentally 'fair' or 'unfair' should ever serve as a substitute for the
explicit, written provisions of our Bill of Rights."' (quoting Ashe, 397 U.S. at 447
(Black, J., concurring))).
30. See Vestal, supra note 2, at 314, 320-21 (stating that defendant typically has
already had opportunity to confront adverse witnesses, and that statistically infrequent incidence of collateral estoppel of accused presents no constitutional con-
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31
court also supported collateral estoppel of status issues such as alienage.
One commentator also considered criminal defendants' constitutional arguments unpersuasive because federal courts often abrogate defendants'
Sixth Amendment rights to a trial byjury. 32 This author reasoned that the
criminal justice system, already skewed in favor of the defendant, should
33
not grant defendants another weapon against the state.

2.

Precluding CollateralEstoppel

Departing from the course set by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in United States v.
34
Pelullo, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
in United States v. Harnage,35 both held that the government may not collaterally estop the accused.3 6 The Eleventh Circuit refuted the Eighth and
flict, because "[c]ertainly there is no constitutional right to use the time of the
courts in repetitive litigation on the same issues"); Kennelly, supra note 28, at 141011 (arguing that defendant had opportunity to confront adverse witnesses during
initial trial); Collateral and Equitable Estoppel, supra note 10, at 1234-37 (suggesting
that, because collateral estoppel involves prior confrontation in front of factfinder
"who scrutinized the demeanor of the adverse witness," confrontation argument
should not preclude collateral estoppel of accused unless accused can demonstrate
ineffective counsel or incomplete cross-examination at previous proceeding).
31. See Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. at 626-29 (stating that status issues such as
alienage should, once proved, be presumed in absence of contrary evidence); see
also Vestal, supra note 2, at 315 (stating that alienage provides classic example of
status appropriate for collateral estoppel by prosecution); Collateral and Equitable
Estoppel, supra note 10, at 1237-38, 1244-45 (stating that cautious collateral estoppel
of status issues does not inappropriately inform juries of defendant's previous
criminal activities). But see CollateralEstoppel Against the Accused, supra note 20, at
518-19 (stating that Rangel-Perez court created far-reaching extension to earlier collateral estoppel cases).
32. See Kennelly, supra note 28, at 1407-10 (suggesting that defendant's right
to jury should not prohibit prosecution's use of collateral estoppel because revocation of probation, appellate entry of convictions on lesser-included offenses and
harmless error review all abrogate defendant's right to jury trial).
33. See id. at 1399-1400 (noting elevated standard of proof, right to effective
counsel, right to confront witnesses and favorable rules of evidence in criminal
cases). This commentator believed that procedural safeguards in criminal cases
already adequately protect criminal defendants. See id. (suggesting absurdity of
supporting non-preclusion based on higher stakes in criminal proceedings, "because that factor actually makes a guilty determination more reliable; the higher
stakes in criminal cases justify efforts beyond those in civil cases to ensure the correctness of the trial outcome.").
34. 14 F.3d 881 (3d Cir. 1994).
35. 976 F.2d 633 (1lth Cir. 1992).
36. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 896 (concluding that Constitution prohibits collateral estoppel of accused); Harnage,976 F.2d at 636 (rejecting collateral estoppel of
accused because doing so does not serve interest ofjudicial economy). In Pelulo, a
jury had previously convicted the defendant of wire fraud. See 14 F.3d at 881. Following his later indictment on 49 counts of wire fraud and one count of racketeering under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), ajury
convicted the defendant of all charges. See id. The lower court allowed the use of
his earlier conviction as a collateral estoppel, preventing the defendant from litigating whether he had been convicted of a "predicate offense," a requirement for
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Ninth Circuits' policy arguments by claiming that collateral estoppel of
criminal defendants would, in fact, hinder judicial economy. 3 7 Specifically, the Harnagecourt contended that tests for allowing collateral estop38
pel consume more time than merely adjudicating the individual issue.
The Eleventh Circuit also asserted that the need to determine the effectiveness of the defendant's prior counsel would further complicate lengthy
evidentiary hearings. 39 The Third Circuit dismissed the judicial economy
argument, asserting that the gravity of the criminal defendant's possible
RICO convictions. See id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the conviction, holding that the defendant's prior jury conviction for
wire fraud could not act as collateral estoppel to establish a predicate offense for
the RICO violation, because the right to a jury trial "necessitates that every jury
empaneled for a prosecution considers evidence of guilt afresh and without the
judicial direction attending collateral estoppel." Id. at 896 (citing In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); State v. Ingenito, 432 A.2d 912, 915-16 (N.J. 1981)).
In Harnage, the federal prosecutors indicted the defendant in Florida and
Texas on drug charges. See 976 F.2d at 633. The defendant claimed that he had
an attomey-client relationship with a key witness to both prosecutions, a fact that
would preclude the introduction of any evidence that witness might have against
him. See id. After the Texas district court held that no such attorney-client relationship existed, the Florida district court held that the Texas determination
would act as a collateral estoppel in the Florida adjudication. See id. The defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which
held that the lower court's determination to collaterally estop the accused had
been in error. See id. The Harnagecourt flatly rejected the government's judicial
economy arguments, obviating the need for a detailed Constitutional analysis. See
id. at 636 n.2.
37. See Harnage,976 F.2d at 634-36 (stating that amount of time involved in
determining whether to allow collateral estoppel "would [not] serve the original
goal of collateral estoppel-judicial economy"); FREEDMAN, supra note 10, at 32
(noting that, in civil cases, offensive collateral estoppel may not well serve judicial
economy because litigants may wait to bring suits rather than intervening in current litigation); Vestal, supra note 2, at 341 (conceding that giving preclusive effect
to criminal prosecutions will occasionally result in additional litigation because
some criminal defendants do not enter into pleas).
38. See Harnage, 976 F.2d at 635 (describing collateral estoppel test that required examination of five elements); see also United States v. Lavasuer, 699 F.
Supp. 965, 981 (D. Mass. 1988) (implementing five-step collateral estoppel test for
previous suppression hearing). The test offered by the Lavasuer court required:
(1) an "identity of issues" in the two proceedings; (2) that the defendant had sufficient incentive to litigate the issue; (3) that the defendant had been a party to the
previous litigation; (4) that the applicable law be identical; and (5) that the prior
proceeding result in a final judgment on the merits that provides opportunity and
incentive to appeal. See id. The Harnagecourt suggested that the resolution of all
five elements of the Lavasuertest would drain judicial resources far more than the
adjudication of the one issue the prosecution sought to collaterally estop. See
Harnage, 976 F.2d at 635 (rejecting Lavaseur test because "it would create more
problems than it was designed to solve").
39. See Harnage,976 F.2d at 636 (stating that examination of effectiveness of
defendant's prior counsel would hinder judicial economy by requiring evidentiary
hearings and review of records from prior proceedings). But see Kennelly, supra
note 28, at 1420 (presuming that defendant would have challenged effectiveness of
counsel earlier if colorable claim of ineffectiveness existed).
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loss of liberty should trump such civil policy concerns. 40 In contrast to the
Third Circuit's reasoning, the Harnagecourt elected not to discuss the issue's constitutional implications because it felt that collateral estoppel of
41
criminal defendants would hinder judicial economy.
The Third Circuit, however, did address the constitutional implications of the issue, contending that collateral estoppel of the accused impermissibly interferes with fundamental due process protections. 4 2 The
Pelullo court stated that collateral estoppel of the accused conflicts with the
presumption of innocence that the defendant should enjoy in every criminal proceeding. 43 Similarly, some defendants have argued that collateral
estoppel conflicts with their constitutionally guaranteed right to confront
adverse witnesses. 44 Commentators have also suggested that collateral estoppel unfairly biases juries by informing them of the defendant's prior
40. See Pellulo, 14 F.3d at 893-94 (noting that accused's interest in vindication
has been held to trump "public interest concerns... of the highest magnitude")
(citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-16 (1974) (stating that right of
accused to vindication trumps executive privilege); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
318-21 (1974) (stating that right of accused to vindication trumps juvenile offenders' interest in anonymity); United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1166-67 (1lth
Cir. 1983) (stating that right of accused to vindication trumps privacy interest in
confidentiality of medical records)). In particular, the Pelullo court noted that policy or efficiency arguments cannot modify the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees the right to a jury trial. See id. at 895 (stating that lack of criminal analogs to
motion for directed verdict or summary judgment demonstrates insusceptibility of
Sixth Amendment to policy considerations).
41. See Harnage, 976 F.2d at 636 n.2 (considering inquiry into due process
implications of issue unnecessary because "we reject the government's use of [collateral estoppel] on the grounds of judicial economy").
42. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 892-95 (analyzing constitutional limitations of collateral estoppel in criminal cases); see also CollateralEstoppel in Criminal Cases, supra
note 12, at 276-77 (noting that due process requires trial of every issue of fact in
every prosecution); Murray, supra note 12, at 936 (stating that due process is generally thought to prohibit prosecution from asserting collateral estoppel against
accused).
43. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 892 (citing favorably line of cases finding that government's collateral estoppel of accused conflicts with presumption of defendant's
innocence); see also State v. Ingenito, 432 A.2d 912, 917 (N.J. 1981) (finding collateral estoppel of accused inapposite with defendant's presumption of innocence as
to every element of crime because it shifts burden of proof to defendant); Collateral
Estoppel Against the Accused, supra note 20, at 521 n.50 (suggesting that collateral
estoppel of accused may violate defendant's presumption of innocence by alleviating prosecution's need to prove every essential element of offense "beyond a reasonable doubt"); Murray, supra note 12, at 936 (stating that collateral estoppel of
criminal defendant may violate presumption of innocence). But see HernandezUribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 21 (8th Cir. 1975) (rejecting defendant's argument that government's collateral estoppel of alienage undermined defendant's
presumption of innocence).
44. See Collateral Estoppel Against the Accused, supra note 20, at 521-22 (noting
that right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses casts doubt on constitutionality of collateral estoppel of accused). But see Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 21
(disagreeing with defendant's argument that government's collateral estoppel of
accused deprives defendants of Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse
witnesses).
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conviction, interferes with juries' nullification power and allows questiona45
ble prosecutorial strategies.
Noting that previous cases had all but ignored the constitutional implications of this issue, the Third Circuit set forth the first detailed judicial
analysis of the constitutional limitations of collateral estoppel of the accused. 46 Examining colonial conceptions of the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury at the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the
Third Circuit found no historical antecedent for applying collateral estoppel against criminal defendants. 4 7 The Third Circuit further suggested
45. See Collateral and Equitable Estoppel supra note 10, at 1237-38 (stating that
collateral estoppel of accused unfairly biases juries by informing them of defendants' prior convictions and encouraging them to make conclusions regarding defendant's character). Some commentators believe that collateral estoppel of the
accused interferes with the jury's nullification power. See Peter Westen, The Three
Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78
MICH. L. Riv. 1001, 1015 n.49 (1980) (suggesting that removing certain issues
from jury's consideration "blinds the jury to the 'whole picture' of a defendant's
conduct" and thus denies jury information on which to exercise veto power); Collateral and Equitable Estoppel, supra note 10, at 1239-42 (concluding that collateral
estoppel in some instances can interfere with juries' power to "nullify" because of
sympathy for defendant). But see Kennelly, supra note 28, at 1403 (stating that
defendant has already had chance at nullification at previous proceeding and
lost). See generally 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 22.1(g), at 959-61 (2d ed. 1992) (discussing jury nullification doctrine). Some
commentators also believe that allowing collateral estoppel of criminal defendants
would encourage questionable prosecutorial strategies. See Collateral and Equitable
Estoppe4 supra note 10, at 1243 (fearing prosecutorial abuse of collateral estoppel
in instances where prosecutor can join two related claims but strategically chooses
not to); CollateralEstoppel Against the Accused, supra note 20, at 521-24 (same); Kennelly, supra note 28, at 1413-16 (suggesting that only argument of "joinder of related offenses may prevent application of issue preclusion in certain cases").
46. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 894 (noting that previous courts "did not conduct a
constitutional analysis," but rather relied on their "perception of 'wise public policy and efficient judicial administration'"); see also Harnage, 976 F.2d at 636 n.2
(failing to reach constitutional issues because of reliance on judicial economy argument); United States v. Ping, 555 F.2d 1069, 1076 (2d Cir. 1977) (electing not to
address "difficult question" of government's collateral estoppel of criminal defendants). Commentators, however, have refuted the holding in Pellulo. See Kennelly,
supra note 28, at 1380 (1994) (concluding that courts, despite valid constitutional
concerns, should limit application of collateral estoppel of accused rather than
precluding it outright); see also Vestal, supra note 2, at 312-21 (suggesting that col-

lateral estoppel of accused does not offend fundamental constitutional rights).
47. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 893-94 (examining Sixth Amendment right to jury at
time of ratification of Bill of Rights); see also Henry P. Monaghan, OurPerfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 374-87 (1981) (suggesting legitimacy of effectuating
"original intent" of Constitution). The Third Circuit found only ambiguous evidence of the government's use of collateral estoppel against criminal defendants at
the Bill of Rights' ratification. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 893-94 (finding no applications of collateral estoppel against accused before ratification of Bill of Rights); see
also Marlyn E. Lugar, CriminalLaw, DoubleJeopardy and ResJudicata,39 IowA L. REv.
317, 319 n.9 (1954) (stating that no plea of resjudicata existed in criminal cases at
early common law); Collateral Estoppel Against the Accused, supra note 20, at 523
(finding only ambiguous evidence of government's use of collateral estoppel
against criminal defendants).
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that the Sixth Amendment guarantee to a trial by jury extends to each
48
judicial proceeding, not merely to every element at its initial adjudication.
The Pelullo court maintained that the right to a jury trial made collateral
estoppel of criminal defendants more than a mere procedural matter,
thereby precluding "procedural reforms" of the doctrine in criminal
cases. 49 Finally, the Third Circuit stated that the literal language of the
Sixth and Seventh Amendments provides a "textual anchor" for precluding collateral estoppel of the accused. 50 The salient differences between
the two Amendments, it asserted, demonstrate that courts should allow
mutuality of collateral estoppel in civil cases, while restricting the doctrine's use to defensive collateral estoppel in criminal cases. 5 1 Thus, the
48. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 893-96 (noting that Sixth Amendment guarantee to
jury trial does not apply merely to first time factual issue is determined, but to each
subsequent determination as well); see also Ingenito, 432 A.2d at 916 ("[The] question is not whether guilt may be spelt out of a record, but whether guilt has been
found by a jury."); Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases, supra note 12, at 276 (suggesting that due process rights guarantee that criminal defendants have trial as to
each issue of fact in every prosecution). The Pelullo court relied on Ingenito, which
held that, because withholding essential evidence compromises the "paramount
deliberative and decisional responsibilities" of the jury, "the application of collateral estoppel against a criminal defendant constitutes an invasion of the ... functions of the jury." Ingenito, 432 A.2d at 916. The Pelullo 'Court found this to be a
"powerful elaboration" of the proposition that collateral estoppel of the accused
violates the constitutional guarantee to ajury trial. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 892 (citing favorably Ingenito decision).
49. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 894 n.7 (rejecting argument that prosecution could
"reform" use of collateral estoppel against accused). The Third Circuit noted that
the Supreme Court does not require adherence to the "procedural exactitudes" of
the Seventh Amendment as they existed in 1791. See id. (citing ParklaneHosiery Co.
v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333-38 (1979) (allowing "procedural reforms" of Seventh
Amendment by permitting non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel in civil cases)).
The court stated, however, that the more stringent Sixth Amendment guarantee to
a trial by jury would not allow such flexibility in criminal cases. See id. (asserting
that courts should not allow procedural reforms under Sixth Amendment); accord
Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 348 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("It can scarcely be
doubted, though, that such 'procedural reforms' would not survive constitutional
scrutiny under the jury trial guarantee of the 6th Amendment."). Furthermore,
the Pelullo court stated that collateral estoppel of criminal defendants is not a procedural matter at all, and therefore not subject to "procedural reform." See Pelullo,
14 F.3d at 894 n.7 (stating that collateral estoppel of accused is not procedural
because it interferes with jury's essential function).
50. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 894-95 (stating that literal interpretation of Sixth and
Seventh Amendments prohibits government's use of collateral estoppel against accused); see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury); U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... ).
The Pelullo court reasoned that the use of compulsory language in both constitutional provisions demonstrates that the "absolute right to a jury trial in all, rather
than in just one, criminal prosecution is obvious from the text...." Pelullo, 14 F.3d
at 894-95.
51. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 895 (comparing language of Seventh Amendment,
which merely "preserved" right to jury trial, with language of Sixth Amendment,
which guarantees right to impartial jury). Specifically, the Pelullo court stated that
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Pelullo court concluded that the Sixth Amendment absolutely precludes
52
collateral estoppel of the accused.
C.

The Narrow Issue: Guilty Pleas as Collateral Estoppel

Before Gallardo-Mendez, only the Eighth Circuit in Hernandez-Uribehad
directly considered the narrower issue of whether a guilty plea may act as
collateral estoppel of the accused.5 3 The Eighth Circuit recognized the
Supreme Court's guidance that "the rule of collateral estoppel in criminal
cases is not to be applied with the hypertechnical and archaic approach of
a 19th century pleading book, but with realism and rationality. ' 54 Consequently, the Hernandez-Uribecourt, citing Brazzell v. Adams 55 and Hyslop v.
United States,5 6 found that a "general rule" accords guilty pleas the same
the differences between the two contemporaneous Amendments demonstrate that
the Framers intended that they have different effects. See id. (noting that guarantee of rights is stronger than mere preservation of rights as they existed at time of
ratification of Bill of Rights). Consequently, the Pelullo court reasoned that efficiency, as a justification for collateral estoppel in civil cases, receives the constitutional sanction of the Seventh Amendment because this practice existed in 1791,
but that such sanction is absent in the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 896 (stating
that Sixth Amendment's language "can be given its full meaning and effect only by
strict application").
52. See id. at 896 (holding that Sixth Amendment precludes application of
offensive collateral estoppel against criminal defendants) (citing U.S. CONST.
amend. VI, which guarantees right to trial by jury "in all criminal prosecutions"));
see also Collateral Estoppel Against the Accused, supra note 20, at 521-24 (calling defendants' rights to jury trial "main problem" with collateral estoppel against criminal defendants, and demonstrating ambiguity of historical evidence of collateral
estoppel of accused); CollateralEstoppel in Criminal Cases, supra note 12, at 277 (suggesting that criminal defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses might be violated by mutuality of estoppel in criminal cases).
53. See Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975)
(holding that court may use collateral estoppel against defendant who previously
pleaded guilty to same charge).
54. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970); see Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at
22 (quoting Ashe decision).
55. 493 F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1974). The plaintiff in Brazzell, a state prisoner,
brought a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the district attorney and
other state agents that participated in his arrest. See id. at 489. The plaintiff sought
damages because of police conduct he likened to entrapment. See id. The Brazzell
court held that the government could collaterally estop the plaintiff in his subsequent civil action as to the facts admitted by his plea of guilty to the underlying
criminal charge. See id. at 490.
56. 261 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1958). Hyslop involved a civil action brought by the
United States for damages pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 231 resulting from the defendant's intentional misbranding of eggs for sale to the United States Army. See id. at
787. The government won on summary judgment based on evidence of the defendant's earlier guilty plea to the related criminal charge. See id. at 790.
Although the defendant admitted that "in an appropriate case the rule of collateral estoppel may be invoked," he appealed its application to his case. Id. The
appellate court, reversing the grant of summary judgment, held that collateral estoppel does not apply where the previous guilty plea fails to either put the fact into
issue or determine the essential elements to be collaterally estopped. See id. at 79092.
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preclusive effect as guilty verdicts in subsequent criminal proceedings. 57
The Eighth Circuit further maintained that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 ("Rule 11"),58 which requires courts to inquire whether a "factual basis" exists for a guilty plea, satisfactorily protects defendants from
the collateral effects of their pleas. 59 Finally, the Hernandez-Uribecourt asserted that a guilty plea effectively waives the defendant's right to contest
the alienage issue before ajury because the defendant failed to take advan60
tage of the opportunity to do so before the first jury.
III.

FAcrs: UNITED STATFS V. GALLiARDo-MENDEZ

Prior to the federal indictment that precipitated this appeal, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) had deported the defendant,
Manuel Gallardo-Mendez, three separate times. 61 On June 5, 1987, Utah
57. See Hernadez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 22 (stating that Brazzell and Hyslop stand for
general rule that collateral estoppel applies equally whether previous criminal conviction was based on jury verdict or guilty plea). Ninth Circuit dictum reached a
similar result. See United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th Cir.
1980) (dictum) (noting general rule that collateral estoppel doctrine applies
equally whether previous criminal conviction was based on jury verdict or guilty
plea) (citing Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1978) and Brazzell,
493 F.2d at 490). In Bejar-Matrecios,the defendant appealed a conviction for illegal
reentry into the United States after a previous deportation. See id. at 82. The
Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction, in part because the prejudice to the defendant outweighed the probative value of the prior conviction. See id. at 84-85.
Ivers, like Brazzell and Hyslop, involved the court's application of the collateral
estoppel doctrine in a civil action subsequent to a guilty plea in a previous criminal
proceeding. See Ivers, 581 F.2d at 1366-67 (applying collateral estoppel against civil
defendant who pleaded guilty in prior criminal proceeding).
58. FED. R. CuM. P. 11 (1999) ("Rule 11"). Rule 11(d) states, "The court shall
not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the
defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not
the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. . .

."

Id.

11(d). Rule 11(f) also provides, "Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of
guilty, the court should not enter ajudgment upon such plea without making such
inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea." 11 (f).
59. See Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 22 (claiming that Rule 11 sufficiently protects criminal defendants in instances of future collateral estoppel).
60. See id.; see also Collateral and Equitable Estoppel, supra note 10, at 1236 (suggesting that guilty plea "operates as a waiver of the ... fundamental rights of the
accused"). The Hernandez-Uribecourt stated that the defendant had the opportunity in the earlier criminal proceeding to contest his alienage or request a jury
trial, but that "[b]y his plea of guilty, defendant waived those constitutional rights
here challenged which are guaranteed every criminal defendant." Hernandez-Uibe,
515 F.2d at 22. The Hernandez-Uribecourt mitigated the implications of its holding
by explaining that the defendant may still challenge the validity of his earlier guilty
plea or introduce evidence that his alien status has changed since the earlier plea.
See id. (suggesting that collateral estoppel of accused did not completely foreclose
defense).
61. See United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1241 (10th Cir.
1998) (noting defendant's three previous deportations); see also Answer Brief of
Plaintiff/Appellee and Cross-Appeal at 2-11, United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150
F.3d 1240 (10th Cir. 1998) (No.97-4062) [hereinafter Government's BrieJ]. The defendant, Manuel Gallardo-Mendez, a/k/a Luis Lizarraga, a/k/a Oscar Berdeja,
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state prosecutors charged the defendant with theft. 62 After his conviction
and subsequent state sentence, Utah state officials turned the defendant
over to the INS for deportation proceedings. 63 During an interview with
an INS special agent on November 18, 1987, the defendant admitted that
his parents, Mexican citizens, gave birth to him in Mexico, and that he had
been smuggled into the United States in 1979.64 A federal immigration
judge ordered the defendant deported to Mexico, for the first time, in
December 1987.65

Less than one year later, on August 26, 1988, authorities again found
the defendant residing illegally in the United States. 66 On September 6,
67
1988, the INS deported him a second time.
On March 28, 1989, Utah state prosecutors charged the defendant
with a drug offense. 68 After the defendant pleaded guilty and served his
sentence, state authorities again turned him over to the INS for deportation proceedings. 69 With that case pending on appeal, the INS again arrested the defendant in April of 1991 on a charge of illegal reentry of a
deported alien. 70 The defendant's brother identified him as Manuel Gallardo-Mendez, a citizen of Mexico. 71 Subsequently, federal authorities indicted the defendant for violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326,72 which criminalizes
73
reentry into the United States by an illegal alien, and 18 U.S.C. § 911,
74
which criminalizes falsely claiming United States citizenship.
The defendant pleaded guilty to the illegal reentry charge.7 5 After the defendant
employed several aliases in order to evade arrest for violating immigration laws. See
Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1241 n.1. For this reason, this Note refers to Mr. Gallardo-Mendez simply as "the defendant."
62. See Government'sBrief supra note 61, at 2-3 (detailing defendant's criminal
history).
63. See id.

64. See id. at 3 (discussing defendant's interview with INS special agent).
65. See Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1241.

66. See Government's Brief supra note 61, at 3 (noting circumstances of defendant's second deportation).
67. See Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1241.
68. See Government's Brief supra note 61, at 3 (detailing defendant's drug

charge in Utah state court).
69. See id.
70. See id. at 4.
71. See id.
72. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1994) (providing that any previously deported alien
that reenters United States shall be fined, imprisoned for not more than two years,
or both). That section also provides that illegal immigrants originally deported for
drug offenses or aggravated felonies may be imprisoned for ten or twenty years.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (requiring longer period of incarceration for aliens deported for drug offenses or violent crimes).

73. See 18 U.S.C. § 911 (1994) ("Whoever falsely and willfully represents himself to be a citizen of the United States shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than three years, or both.").
74. See United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1241 (10th Cir.
1998) (stating charges under which government indicted defendant).
75. See id.
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completed his sentence, federal authorities turned him over to the INS,
76
which, on February 7, 1992, deported him for a third time.
Most recently, on May 18, 1995, the Utah County Sheriff's Office informed the INS that they had charged the defendant with extortion. 77 In
September 1995, a Utah state court convicted the defendant and sentenced him to a state prison term. 78 The INS indicted the defendant in
August of 1996 on charges of illegal reentry of a deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, the same criminal statute to which he had already
7
pleaded guilty in 1991.

9

The defendant then filed a motion with the United States District
Court for the District of Utah, asking for a pretrial determination that
would allow him to contest his illegal alien status. 80 The government then

filed a motion in limine requesting that the court use the defendant's previous guilty plea to collaterally estop him from contesting his alienage at
trial. 81 The district court granted the government's motion and used the
defendant's 1991 plea to collaterally estop the defendant's alienage before
1991; it allowed, however, the defendant to introduce evidence that his
illegal alien status had since changed. 8 2 The district court instructed the
jury that a prior judicial determination, the defendant's guilty plea, had
determined that the defendant was an illegal alien prior to 1991.83 After
his conviction and subsequent sentence to ninety-six months imprisonment, the defendant appealed his conviction to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 84 The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that
the use of a guilty plea to collaterally estop a defendant from relitigating
an issue in a subsequent criminal proceeding violates the Due Process
85
Clause of the United States Constitution.

76. See Government's Brief supra note 61, at 4 (discussing defendant's prior

deportations).
77. See id. at 4-5.

78. See Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1241 (detailing defendant's prior
convictions).
79. See id. (noting defendant's prior guilty plea to identical charge).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id. (discussing trial court's decision on collateral estoppel issue).
83. See id. at 1242, 1242 n.2 (including transcript of jury instructions). The
jury instructions regarding the defendant's alienage stated: "There has been ajudicial determination in litigation, to which the defendant was a party, that on and
prior to July 26, 1991, defendant was an alien and not a citizen of the United
States. The defendant is bound by that determination." Id.
84. See id. (noting defendant's appeal and government's cross-appeal).
85. See id. at 1246 (holding that Due Process Clause protections prevent government's use of prior guilty pleas to collaterally estop criminal defendants from
relitigating issues in subsequent criminal proceeding).
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ANALYSIS

NarrativeAnalysis

The Tenth Circuit began its review by noting the lack of precedential
guidance from its own cases or those of its sister circuits, and then confined its discussion to whether a guilty plea may act as collateral estoppel
of a criminal defendant.8 6 The Gallardo-Mendez court then criticized the
87
holdings of the circuits that allow collateral estoppel of the accused.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the judicial economy argument because it
found that granting preclusive effect to guilty pleas might discourage defendants from entering into them. 88 The court also noted that the complex tests used to determine whether to apply collateral estoppel would
89
consternate district court judges, thereby hindering judicial economy.
The Tenth Circuit next stated that judicial economy, which justifies the
doctrine's use in the civil arena, should not carry the same weight in the
criminal arena. 90 In this vein, the court also stated that the Supreme
86. See id. at 1242 n.3 (noting clear split among circuits that have ruled on
whether government may collaterally estop criminal defendants from raising issues
adjudicated in prior criminal proceedings). The Tenth Circuit narrowed its analysis to the collateral effects of guilty pleas in subsequent criminal proceedings. See
id. at 1243 (stating that facts of case sub judice made more general investigation of
collateral estoppel of criminal defendants unnecessary).
87. See id. at 1243-44 (criticizing Eighth and Ninth Circuits' reliance on public
policy to justify collateral estoppel of accused).
88. See id. at 1243 ("The prospect of being collaterally estopped at some future date may discourage defendants from settling criminal charges by pleading
guilty.") (citing Kennelly, supra note 28, at 1421-22 (1994) (suggesting that giving
pleas preclusive effect would create uncertain "plea bargain pricing" and make
pleas less desirable to criminal defendants))).
89. See id. at 1243-44 (stating that Rule 1l's burden of ensuring that defendants enter into guilty pleas "knowingly," combined with potentially complex collateral estoppel tests, would make federal judges' jobs more difficult); accord United
States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 634-36 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (rejecting use of collateral
estoppel against criminal defendants on grounds of judicial economy); United
States v. Colacurcio, 514 F.2d 1, 6-7 (9th Cir. 1975) (rejecting application of collateral estoppel against criminal defendant where monetary amounts were not directly determined as issue in prior proceeding).
90. See Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1244 (noting that, although idea of judicial economy provides sufficient justification in civil context, public policy and judicial economy "do not have the same weight and value in criminal cases") (citing
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 464 (1970) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (stating that
conservation ofjudicial resources is lesser value in criminal cases than in civil litigation); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (differentiating criminal and civil
contexts by noting that criminal defendant's liberty interest is "interest of transcending value")). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit listed
several cases in which courts subordinate public policy concerns to the criminal
defendant's interest in vindication. See id. (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683, 703-16 (1974) (holding that accused's interest in vindication trumps President's general claim of absolute executive privilege); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308,
318-21 (1974) (holding that accused's interest in vindication trumps juvenile offenders' interest in anonymity); United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1166-67
(11th Cir. 1983) (holding that accused's interest in vindication trumps patient's
privacy interest in confidentiality of medical records)).
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Court made collateral estoppel available to criminal defendants not as a
matter ofjudicial economy, but rather because of its relation to the Fifth
Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy. 9 1 Thus, the Tenth Circuit, guided by the Third Circuit's decision in Pellulo, declared that "'the
liberty interest of a criminal defendant takes priority over the usual concerns for efficient judicial administration
proceedings.' "92

so often

found in civil

The Tenth Circuit then criticized the Eighth Circuit's failure to differentiate between the use of guilty pleas and verdicts as the basis of collateral estoppel in subsequent criminal proceedings. 9 3 The court noted that
each decision cited by the Eighth Circuit involved the use of collateral
estoppel based on criminal guilty pleas in a subsequent civil case, not a
criminal case. 94 The Tenth Circuit, therefore, dismissed the "general
rule" that guilty pleas may act to collaterally estop defendants in a subse95
quent criminal proceeding.
The Gallardo-Mendez court then questioned the Eighth Circuit's conclusion that courts need not conduct full adversary proceedings as a prerequisite to collateral estoppel of criminal defendants. 96 The court stated
91. See Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1244 (noting that Constitution, rather
than judicial economy, justifies criminal defendants' use of collateral estoppel)
(citing Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445 (holding that criminal defendant's use of collateral
estoppel against state is "embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against
double jeopardy")).
92. Id. (quoting United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 893 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
different policy concerns in civil and criminal cases)).
93. See id. at 1244-45 (criticizing Hernandez-Uibecourt's conclusion that "general rule" accords guilty pleas same preclusive effect as verdicts). The Gallardo-

Mendez court questioned the pertinence of the cases cited by the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits as demonstrating this general rule. See id. at 1244-45 n.6 (questioning

whether Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1978), Brazzell v. Adams, 493
F.2d 489 (5th Cir. 1974) and Hyslop v. United States, 261 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1958)
stand for "general rule" that courts may apply collateral estoppel against criminal
defendants regardless of whether court based earlier conviction on guilty plea or
verdict).
94. See id. at 1244-45, 1245 n.6 (noting that facts of Brazzell, Hyslop, and Ivers all
involved use of guilty plea as collateral estoppel in subsequent civil case, not criminal case).
95. See id. at 1245 (rejecting Hernandez-Uribe"general rule"). The GallardoMendez court stated:
These cases neither support nor explain the jump from applying the collateral estoppel doctrine against a defendant in a civil proceeding related
to the underlying criminal transaction to which the defendant pled
guilty, to applying the doctrine against a defendant whose liberty interest
is at stake in a successive criminal proceeding arising from a different
criminal transaction.
Id. (emphasis added).
96. See id. (criticizing Hernandez-Uribecourt's conclusion that "full adversary
proceeding" was not prerequisite to collateral estoppel of accused) (citing Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 22 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that Rule II's factual basis test
adequately protects criminal defendants from improvident guilty pleas); United
States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding that court's
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that Rule 1I's safeguards "are not tantamount to the full panoply of protections afforded by ajury trial" because the Rule's "factual basis' requirement for guilty pleas falls short of the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard that courts require the prosecution satisfy before entering a valid
guilty verdict.9 7 Noting that differences between burdens of proof permit
courts to reject collateral estoppel in civil cases, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that a difference between the burdens of proof in two criminal proceedings should also preclude the application of the doctrine. 98 Thus, the
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's holding and concluded that according guilty pleas preclusive effect in subsequent criminal proceedings
violates the defendant's constitutional right to due process. 99

B.

CriticalAnalysis

The Tenth Circuit properly decided Gallardo-Mendez for several reasons. 100 First, it remains unclear whether collateral estoppel of the accused would indeed serve the interest of judicial economy.1 0 ' Second,
mutuality of estoppel offends the fundamental principles of criminal jurisprudence. 10 2 Third, collateral estoppel of status issues such as alienage
may create more problems than it would solve. 10 3 Fourth, existing procedural safeguards do not adequately protect defendants from the unexestoppel of criminal defendant based on earlier "knowing and voluntary" guilty
plea is fair)).
97. Id. The Gallardo-Mendez court stated that the "factual basis" burden is a
lower burden of proof than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden. See id. (stating that Rule 11 requirements fall short of due process "beyond a reasonable
doubt" requirement).
98. See id. at 1245-46 (noting that Supreme Court precedent has demonstrated that differences in proof requirements of subsequent proceedings may preclude application of collateral estoppel) (citing United States v. One Assortment of 89
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362 (1984) ("[lit is clear that the difference in the relative
burdens of proof in criminal and civil actions precludes the application of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel."); Helvering v. Mitchell 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938)
(stating that differences in degree of burden of proof may preclude application of
doctrine of res judicata in civil cases)).
99. See id. at 1246 ("[T]he government's use of a guilty plea to collaterally
estop a defendant from relitigating an issue in a subsequent criminal proceeding is
contrary to the Due Process Clause.").
100. See id. (holding that due process protections prevent government's offensive collateral estoppel of criminal defendants based on prior guilty pleas). For a
discussion of the propriety of the Tenth Circuit's decision, see infra notes 106-65
and accompanying text.
101. For a discussion of collateral estoppel's effects on judicial economy in
criminal cases, see infra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
102. For a discussion of the mutuality of estoppel theory in criminal cases, see
infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
103. For a discussion of the inappropriateness of collateral estoppel of the
accused based on alienage status, see infra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
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pected collateral effects of their guilty pleas. 10 4 Finally, collateral estoppel
of the accused cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny because the Sixth
10 5
Amendment prohibits its use against the accused.
1.

It Is Unclear Whether CollateralEstoppel of CriminalDefendants Would
Serve JudicialEconomy

Courts that favor collateral estoppel of criminal defendants justify
their holdings by invoking compelling policy interests. 10 6 For example,
illegal immigration increases the burden on federal courts by requiring
the determination of immigrants' alienage prior to deportation. 10 7 This
problem has caused much concern among commentators and politicians,
and has led to extensive remedial legislation. 108 Another often invoked
policy concern, the federal docket backlog, has occasioned similar anxiety. 109 Unfortunately, the Administrative Office of the United States
104. For a discussion of the inadequacy of present procedural safeguards in
terms of collateral estoppel of criminal defendants, see infra notes 134-55 and accompanying text.
105. For a discussion of the Sixth Amendment's prohibitive effect on collateral estoppel of the accused, see infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
106. See Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 21-22 (8th Cir. 1975)
(stating that relitigation of alienage issue undermines purposes of federal immigration laws); Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1968)
(noting that absent threat of collateral estoppel of alienage, defendants would
have added incentive to attempt illegal reentry). For a further discussion of the
policy arguments offered by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, see infra notes 107-11
and accompanying text.
107. See Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, FederalJudicialCaseload: A Five Year Retrospective 9-10 (1998), availablein (visited Apr. 4, 1999) <http://www.uscourts.gov/Caseload.pdf> (stating that immigration cases have risen consistently, rising 168% from 1993 to 1997); see also Peter H.
Schuck, The Re-Evaluation of American Citizenship, 12 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 4-6 (1997)
(noting that ineffective border control has allowed annual entrance of more than
one million illegal aliens, creating current estimated population of illegal aliens
that totals over five million). Superior financial opportunities often motivate
aliens to illegally immigrate to the United States. See SANFORD J. UNGAR, FRESH
BLOOD: THE NEW AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS 350 (1995) (stating that in 1995 approximately two billion people worldwide lived below U.S. poverty level); Karen M. Longacher, Losing The Forest For The Trees: How Current Immigration Proposals Overlook
CrucialIssues, 11 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 429, 441-46 (1997) (noting that prospect
of employment, public education, health care and welfare in United States encourage immigration).
108. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 237 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring) (calling illegal immigration "problem of serious national proportions"); MILTON D.
MORRIS, IMMIGRATION-THE BELEAGUERED BuREAucRAcY 51 (1985) (suggesting
that illegal immigration has generated more concern than any other immigration
issue). This concern has lead to recent remedial legislation. See Longacher, supra
note 107, at 438 (noting legislative measures taken to restrict illegal immigration);
Gerald L. Neuman, Admissions and Denials: A Diologic Introduction to the Immigration
Law Symposium, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1395, 1395-97 (1997) (noting sweeping changes
in immigration policy and recent passage of three remedial immigration statutes).
109. See Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff
Autonomy and the Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITr. L. REv. 809,
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Courts expects the backlog to continue growing 1 0 The severity of this
backlog may deleteriously effect the quality of the federal bench. 1 1
At first blush it seems that the liberal application of the collateral estoppel doctrine against the accused would help federal courts address
these growing problems.1 12 Several factors indicate, however, that collateral estoppel may have the opposite effect. 1 13 The complex tests for deter-

mining whether to apply collateral estoppel in a particular criminal
proceeding may undermine the doctrine's benefits. 114 Furthermore, using guilty pleas as a basis for collateral estoppel could actually hinderjudi811 (1989) (noting that duplicative litigation and resulting docket delays cause
major problems in federal courts); Daniel E. Hinde, Note, Consensual Sentencing in
the Magistrate Court, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1161, 1162 (1997) (discussing growing concern
over crowded federal dockets); Mecham, supra note 107, at 1 (stating that data
demonstrates increase in federal courts' caseload that has reached record heights
in appellate courts).
110. See Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Message from the Director,THE ADMINISTRA.
TIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 3 (1993) (forecasting that federal
bench will experience increased demands in near future).
111. See Mecham, supra note 107, at 1, 10, 12 (stating that no new Article III
judgeships have been created since 1990, several federal judgeships remain vacant,
federal judges' workloads have risen significantly over last five years, average time
required to dispose of case has increased and federal courts have become reliant
on senior judges); see also Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles
To Define the ProperLimits for Federal CriminalJurisdiction,46 HAsTINcS L.J. 979, 99193 (1995) (lamenting effects ofjudicial backlog on quality of federal bench); John
B. Oakley, The Myth of Cost-FreeJurisdictional Reallocation, 543 ANNALS Am. AcAD.
POL. & Soc. Sci. 52, 62 (1996) (suggesting that federal docket backlog may deleteriously effect quality of federal bench).
112. See Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 21-22 (8th Cir. 1975)
(adopting Rangel-Perez court's reasoning that judicial administration supports collateral estoppel of criminal defendants' alienage); Pena-Cabanillas v. United
States, 394 F.2d 785, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating that choosing not to apply
collateral estoppel would frustrate immigration laws' goal of discouraging illegal
entry); United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619, 626 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (approving government's use of offensive collateral estoppel); Murray, supranote 12,
at 940-41 (concluding that collateral estoppel would conserve some court time that
would otherwise be consumed in relitigation). But seeJonathan C. Thau, Collateral
Estoppel and the Reliability of CriminalDeterminations: Theoretical, Practical,and Strategic ImplicationsforCriminaland Civil Litigation,70 GEO. L.J. 1079, 1083 (1982) (criticizing misconception that collateral estoppel promotes judicial economy,
especially in case of offensive collateral estoppel).
113. For a discussion of the factors that demonstrate according preclusive effect to guilty pleas would in fact hinder judicial economy, see infra notes 114-17
and accompanying text.
114. See United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir.
1998) (noting that collateral estoppel of accused would increase judicial burden
because federal judges, required to ensure that defendants enter into guilty pleas
"knowingly," would need to apply complex estoppel tests); United States v.
Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 635 (l1th Cir. 1992) (deciding that applying five-prong
collateral estoppel test would "create more problems than it was designed to
solve"). Determining whether the defendant's counsel had mounted an effective
defense in the earlier proceeding might also require costly evidentiary hearings
and review of records from prior proceedings, completely defeating the goal of
judicial economy. See id. at 636 ("The fact that this type of review process would be
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1 15
cial economy by deterring defendants from entering into guilty pleas.
For example, criminal proceedings arguably require a greater emphasis
on judicial economy than civil cases. 116 The need to prevent erroneous
convictions, however, outweighs even this important policy because collateral estoppel of incorrect decisions would perpetuate previous mistakes.1 17 Thus, the putative benefits of allowing collateral estoppel of the
accused appear dubious at best. Concluding that the doctrine is not justified on judicial economy grounds does not dispose of the analysis, however, because closer scrutiny further highlights the impropriety of
collateral estoppel of the accused.' 1 8

necessary . . . completely defeats the doctrine's goal-judicial efficiency and
economy.").
115. For a discussion of the effect of allowing collateral estoppel of guilty
pleas in subsequent criminal proceedings, see infra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
116. See Robert E. Knowlton, CriminalLaw and Procedure, 11 RUTGERS L. REv.
71, 94 (1956) (considering waste of judicial resources in criminal cases of great
import); Murray, supra note 12, at 941-42 (noting that considerations unique to
criminal law require preeminence of judicial economy). For example, delay in
criminal cases constitutes a more significant burden because, although civil litigants lose only money, criminal defendants lose their freedom and employment,
suffer anxiety and public opprobrium and experience curtailment of their rights
to free speech and association. See id. at 941-42 (discussing preeminence of judicial economy in criminal cases). Delays in criminal cases can also hinder the deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. See id. at 942 (discussing modern psychological
research that suggests deterrent efficacy of sanction varies inversely with length of
time between criminal act and imposition of punishment). Therefore, collateral
estoppel of criminal defendants could theoretically reduce delays and their attendant hardships on criminal defendants. See id. (concluding that expanded use of
collateral estoppel in criminal context would promote policies integral to criminal
jurisprudence). Federal legislation recognizes the preeminence of judicial economy in criminal cases. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1994) ("Speedy Trial Act")
(granting priority to federal criminal cases).
117. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 464 (1970) (Burger, CJ., dissenting)
("[I]n criminal cases, finality and conservation of private, public, and judicial resources are lesser values than in civil litigation."); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 36364 (1970) (stating that criminal cases, unlike civil cases, imperil interests of "transcending value" including loss of liberty and social stigmatization caused by conviction); Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1244 (stating that, in context of collateral
estoppel, judicial efficiency in criminal cases does not have same weight and value
as in civil cases); Pelullo v. United States, 14 F.3d 881, 893 (3d Cir. 1994) (declaring that criminal defendants' liberty interests take priority over usual concerns for
efficient judicial administration so often found in civil proceedings); People v.
Berkowitz, 406 N.E.2d 783, 789-90 (N.Y. 1980) (noting that preeminent need to
ensure correctness of results in criminal cases makes collateral estoppel less relevant in criminal cases); see also Daniel K. Mayers & Fletcher L. Yarbrough, Bis Vexar: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions,74 HARv. L. REv. 1, 32 (1960) (stating that
conservation of judicial resources is less important to criminal law); Austin W.
Scott, Introduction, 39 IowA L. REv. 214, 216 (1954) (stating that criminal cases
involve questions of policy quite different than civil cases).
118. Cf Harnage,976 F.2d at 636 n.2 (choosing not to address constitutional
implications of issue because collateral estoppel of accused fails on judicial economy grounds).
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Mutuality of Estoppel in Criminal Cases Conflicts with the Nature of
CriminalJurisprudence

The mutuality of estoppel theory, as applied to the estoppel of criminal defendants, seeks an appealing symmetry between civil and criminal
cases. 119 This symmetry, however, contradicts the constitutional foundation of our criminal jurisprudence.1 20 Mutuality of collateral estoppel in
criminal cases ignores the inherent differences between civil and criminal
procedures. 12 1 For example, criminal prosecutors must satisfy a heightened burden of proof, receive no benefit of evidentiary presumptions and
must prove every element of their case. 122 Moreover, criminal cases do
119. See Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1968)
(stating that collateral estoppel of criminal defendant is closely related to whether
mutuality of estoppel applies equally in civil and criminal cases); United States v.
Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619, 625 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (stating that "wise public
policy" and "common sense judicial administration" advocate same application of
collateral estoppel in criminal as in civil cases); see also Kennelly, supra note 28, at
1399 (stating that Court holdings present "no serious obstacle" to allowing offensive use of collateral estoppel by prosecution in criminal cases). But see Brainerd
Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L.
REv. 281, 289 (1957) (warning that experience has demonstrated that extending
"dangerous instrument" of collateral estoppel by "merely logical processes of manipulation may produce" results abhorrent to justice and order).
120. See, e.g., Ashe, 397 U.S. at 464-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[Clourts...
would certainly not apply [collateral estoppel] to both parties, as is true in civil
cases, i.e., here, if [the defendant] had been convicted at the first trial, presumably
no court would then hold that he was thereby foreclosed from litigating the identification issue at the second trial"); Knapp v. Cardwell, 667 F.2d 1253, 1268 n.5 (9th
Cir. 1982) (Adams, J., dissenting) (stating that mutuality doctrine should not apply
to collateral estoppel in criminal proceedings because defendants, not prosecutors, enjoy protections of Double Jeopardy Clause); United States v. Bruno, 333 F.
Supp. 570, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("[C]ollateral estoppel is available as a defense
even though it can never be raised offensively by the prosecution."); CollateralEstoppel in Criminal Cases, supra note 12, at 276-77, 282 (noting that defendant's right
to confront adverse witnesses, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, might be violated by mutual application of collateral estoppel in criminal cases and concluding
that different policy considerations in civil and criminal cases require abandonment of mutuality rule in criminal cases).
121. See, e.g., Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 117, at 32-33 (suggesting that
risk of harassment and erroneous resolution is increased in criminal cases because
state has more urgent interest in securing punishment of criminal than in compensation of pecuniary loss); CollateralEstoppel in Criminal Cases, supra note 12, at 282
(noting that different policy considerations in criminal jurisprudence make certain characteristics of collateral estoppel inapplicable). But see Thau, supra note
112, at 1088 n.39 (stating that "[iut is palpably unrealistic to view civil actions as
fundamentally less important than all criminal actions" because some criminal acts
affect few people, while some civil suits, such as antitrust or securities class actions,
involve thousands of individuals).
122. See, e.g., Kennelly, supra note 28, at 1399 (noting elevated standard of
proof, right to effective counsel, right to confront witnesses and favorable rules of
evidence in criminal cases). It has also been suggested that, where the propriety of
collateral estoppel is in doubt, the court should err in favor of the defendant. See
CollateralEstoppel in Criminal Cases, supra note 12, at 295 (suggesting that doubt
concerning application of collateral estoppel should operate to advantage of criminal defendant); see also 18 MooRE ET AL., supra note 10, § 132.01 [4] [d] (describing
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not allow procedural mechanisms comparable to making a motion for directed verdict or summary judgment in civil cases. 1 23 Finally, supporting
mutuality of estoppel in criminal cases ignores the fact that the Constitution, not judicial economy, requires that courts allow criminal defendants
to use the doctrine.
3.

12 4

Alienage Is Not A "Status" That Should Be Estopped

Alienage proceedings implicate different rights than typical criminal
proceedings. 125 Most importantly, they involve only a risk of deportation,
not incarceration. 12 6 Thus, the idiosyncracies of alienage proceedings arguably make them a more viable forum for collateral estoppel than common criminal proceedings. 1 27 Alienage proceedings also involve the
collateral estoppel, unlike res judicata, as "an equitable doctrine" that courts
should apply only when issue and alignment of parties warrant its application).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 895 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
absence of mechanism available to government similar to civil procedures for making motion for directed verdict or summary judgment).
124. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445-46 (holding that Fifth Amendment requires
availability of collateral estoppel to criminal defendant); see also Pelullo, 14 F.3d at
896 ("The value of efficiency that motivates the application of collateral against the
defendant in civil cases, which existed in 1791, receives the constitutional sanction
of the Seventh Amendment. Such sanction is absent in the Sixth Amendment.").
125. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), U.S.C. § 292 (1976)
(granting mere "privilege" of representation, at no expense to government, to persons appearing before administrative judges); Matter of Santos, 19 I. & N. Dec.
105, 1 Immigr. Rptr. B1-99 (BIA 1984) (holding that no absolute Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists in removal proceedings); 6 CHARLEs GORDON ET AL.,
IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE § 72.04[12] [d] (rev. ed. 1998) (summarizing
right to counsel in immigration proceedings). Alienage proceedings do not necessarily involve jury trials as well. See Kennelly, supra note 28, at 1383-84 (noting that
deportation proceeding took place before immigration judge rather than jury)

(citing Howard v. INS, 930 F.2d 432, 435-36 (5th Cir. 1991)).
Aliens do, however, enjoy protection under the Due Process Clause. See 1
GORDON ET AL., supra,§ 6.02 (stating that Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments shelter citizens, legal aliens and illegal aliens against arbitrary government action and
assure procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings). For example, federal law
also requires aliens be given a "reasonable opportunity to be present" at their de-

portation hearings.

See INA, U.S.C. § 242(b); 6

GORDON

ET

AL.,

supra,

§ 72.04[12] [e] (summarizing federal alien notice requirement). Aliens also have a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence on their behalf. See 6 GORDON ET AL.,
supra, § 72.04[12] [f] (noting that aliens may present evidence at deportation hearings). Finally, the Confrontation Clause permits aliens to confront adverse witnesses at deportation hearings under the Confrontation Clause. See 6 GORDON ET
AL., supra, § 72.04[12] [g] (stating that right of person at deportation hearing to
confront adverse witnesses is unquestioned).
126. See Kennelly, supra note 28, at 1383-84 (considering risk of deportation
less substantial than risk of incarceration). But see Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33,
50 (1950) ("A deportation hearing involves issues basic to human liberty and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands to which aliens may be returned,
perhaps to life itself.").
127. See United States v. Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. 619, 626-29 (S.D. Cal.
1959) (supporting propriety of collateral estoppel of alienage); Vestal, supra note
2, at 315 (stating that status of alienage should form basis of collateral estoppel of
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determination of status issues that, because they do not directly indicate
guilt, seemingly provide a better basis for collateral estoppel of the accused. 128 Moreover, collateral estoppel of mere status issues may not improperly bias juries; using the doctrine would not inform jurors of
criminal acts so similar to the instant charge that they would presume
1 29
guilt.
Creating an exception solely for alienage, however, might not survive
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.1 30 Moreover, creating an ex-

accused); Kennelly, supra note 28, at 1383-84 (concluding that "peculiar nature of
alienage proceedings" justifies collateral estoppel of alienage issues).
128. See Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. at 626-29 (emphasizing propriety of applying collateral estoppel to status issues because conditions of status, once proved,
should be presumed in absence of contrary evidence); Vestal, supra note 2, at 315
(stating that alienage is classic example of status being element of criminal conduct that can act as estoppel). But see Collateral Estoppel Against the Accused, supra
note 20, at 518-19 (stating that Rangel-Perez court, despite limiting its holding to
questions of status, broadened scope of earlier estoppel cases). That most of the
collateral estoppel cases involve the status of alienage demonstrates that some
courts consider it an appropriate status for estoppel purposes. Compare United
States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1241 (10th Cir. 1998) (involving reentry
of illegal alien defendant), Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 21 (8th
Cir. 1975) (same), and Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785, 786 (9th
Cir. 1968) (same), with Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 888 (involving wire fraud and other federal offenses) and United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 633 (11th Cir. 1992)
(involving prosecution of drug offenses).
129. See Collateral and EquitableEstoppel, supra note 10, at 1237-38, 1244-45 (accepting cautious collateral estoppel of status issues because doing so neither inappropriately informs jury of crimes similar to instant charge nor allows presumption
that defendant committed crime). That one can distinguish the status of alienage
from the act of illegal entry supports the conclusion that collateral estoppel of the
former is appropriate but of the latter is not. See id. at 1244 (noting that status
issues are not indicative of per se criminal activity, although actions are elements
of crimes that often dispose juries to finding of guilt). But see Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982) (discussing claim that illegal aliens are "suspect class"
and suggesting that entry into class of illegal aliens "is itself a crime").
130. See Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 (1977) (considering significant that
statute "is directed at aliens and that only aliens are harmed by it"); Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 64243, 656 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (requiring
strict scrutiny of statutes effecting rights of aliens). It does not appear significant
that aliens may remove themselves voluntarily from the protected class by naturalizing. See Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 18 (stating that Supreme Court has never construed
protected class of aliens so narrowly as to include only aliens in country for less
than five years). But see Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 658 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that status of aliens is not immutable because aliens may take steps to alter this
status). Illegal aliens, however, do not enjoy membership in a class protected by
the "fatal in fact" strict scrutiny test. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19 (noting that
membership in class of illegal aliens, unlike other classes, "is the product of voluntary action" and "[i]ndeed, entry into the class is itself a crime"). For a further
discussion of aliens and the Equal Protection Clause, see 6 GORDON ET AL., supra
note 125, § 71.02[3] [c] (discussing equal protection challenges to federal immi-

gration policies) and

GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

748-55 (3d ed.

1996) (discussing implications of alienage on Equal Protection Clause analysis).
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ception solely for alienage smacks of xenophobia.13 1 Finally, creating a
broad exception for all status issues would necessitate much litigation di32
rected at determining exactly which statuses fall within the exception.'
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit properly refused to carve out exceptions to
the Sixth Amendment's protections for alienage adjudications or similar

status determinations.
4.

133

Guilty Pleas Do Not Justify CollateralEstoppel of the Accused

The Tenth Circuit in Gallardo-Mendez properly distinguished between
guilty pleas and guilty verdicts.' 34 The position that voluntary guilty pleas
should bind the defendant in future proceedings has an enticing simplic131. See, e.g., Arthur C. Baer, Latino Human Rights and the Global Economic Order, 18 CHIcANo-LATINo L. REV. 80, 80-81 (1996) (stating that discriminatory policies communicate to alien groups that "'you are subordinate, not a full partner in
our society-you are outsiders whom we will control."'); Tanya Kateri Hernandez,
The Construction of Race and Class Buffers in the Structure of Immigration Controls and
Laws, 76 OR. L. Rv. 731, 731-32 (1997) (noting current anti-immigrant sentiment,
and "national preoccupation with the maintenance of a 'White country"'); A.M.
Rosenthal, Editorial, Dred Scott in San Diego, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1996, at A27
("[T] he stinkweed of anti-immigrant prejudice [has spread] across the country.");
see also THOMAS BAILEY ALDRICH, THE POEMS OF THOMAS BAILEY ALDRICH 71-72
(1907) ("Wide open and unguarded stand our gates,/And through them presses a
wild motley throng-/ ... /O liberty, white Goddess! is it well/To leave the gates
unguarded?"), excerpted in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 50-51 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997). Antiquity
provides the best examples of idealism in alienage policy. See EMMA LAZARUS, THE
NEW COLOSSUS (1883) ("Give me your tired, your poor,/Your huddled masses

yearning to breathe free,/The wretched of your teeming shore./Send these, the
homeless, tempest-tost to me,/I lift my lamp beside the golden door."), reprinted in
EMMA LAZARUS: SELECTIONS FROM HER POETRY AND PROSE 48 (Morris U. Schappes
ed., 3d ed. 1967); Deuteronomy 10:19 ("Love ye therefore the stranger.").
132. See Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. at 625-26 (approving of state court decisions
allowing collateral estoppel of paternity status); 40 WORDS AND PHRASES, Status 12832 (1964) (listing possible status issues, including alienage, citizenship, habitual
criminal status, marriage, parentage, infancy, legitimacy, master/servant relationship, ownership, seniority in employment and enlistment in armed services); Vestal, supra note 2, at 315-17 (suggesting that alienage, paternity, method of
operation and competency are prime examples of constant statuses that prosecution should not have to continually relitigate); Collateraland EquitableEstoppel, supra
note 10, at 1222 n.12, 1244 (citing cases involving possible collateral estoppel of
status issues such as paternity, self-defense and insanity, and suggesting propriety

of estoppel of other status issues such as non-ownership of stolen goods).
133. Compare, e.g., Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1246 (refusing to use plea of
guilty to illegal entry as collateral estoppel in subsequent criminal proceeding),
with Rangel-Perez, 179 F. Supp. at 626-29 (supporting propriety of collateral estoppel of alienage), Collateral and Equitable Estoppel, supra note 10, at 1237-38, 1244
(suggesting propriety of collateral estoppel of status of alienage), and Kennelly,
supra note 28, at 1383-84 (suggesting that collateral estoppel of alienage does not
substantially conflict with constitutional protections).
134. See Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1244-46 (distinguishing between guilty
pleas and verdicts for criminal collateral estoppel purposes).
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ity. 13 5 Several factors nonetheless demonstrate that this simplicity robs
13 6
criminal defendants of necessary procedural protections.
First, "realism and rationality" do not advocate according guilty pleas
preclusive effect. 137 The Ashe decision does not support estoppel of the
accused, because, as then-Chief-Justice Burger's dissent makes clear, it anticipated only the defensive application of collateral estoppel against the
state.' 3 8 Moreover, "realism and rationality" demonstrate that many criminal defendants enter guilty pleas for reasons unrelated to their guilt, maki3 9
ing collateral estoppel of their pleas patently unfair.
135. See United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 84 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Because a knowing and voluntary guilty plea constitutes an admission of all the material facts alleged in the indictment . . . it is fair to estop a defendant from
relitigating a common material fact even at a subsequent criminal proceeding.");
Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975) (claiming that
defendant, by voluntary plea, waived constitutional fights in subsequent criminal
proceeding); Vestal, supra note 2, at 295 ("If the defendant in entering a plea of
guilty really admits the truthfulness of the charge, then should not the admission
be binding when it becomes a judgment?"); Collateral and Equitable Estoppel supra
note 10, at 1236 (suggesting that knowing and voluntary plea constitutes admission
of material facts in indictment and "operates as a waiver of the . . . fundamental
rights of the accused").
136. For a discussion of the factors that combine to advocate not according
preclusive effect to guilty pleas, see infra notes 137-55 and accompanying text.
137. See Hernandez-Uibe,515 F.2d at 22 (relying on notion that federal cases
require application of collateral estoppel in criminal cases "with realism and rationality" (quoting Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444 (1970)).
138. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 444 (stating that federal courts should use collateral
estoppel "with realism and rationality"). The Ashe decision defined "realism and
rationality" in terms of defensive collateral estoppel only. See id. (stating that court
must inquire "whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict upon an
issue other than that which the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration")
(emphasis added). Moreover, ChiefJustice Burger's dissent demonstrates that the
Supreme Court did not intend for the decision to apply to offensive collateral estoppel of the accused. See id. at 464-65 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[Clourts that
have applied the collateral-estoppel concept to criminal actions would certainly
not apply it to both parties, as is true in civil cases . .

").

139. See Plunkett v. Commissioner, 465 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1972) (demonstrating that prosecutions threaten charges against family members to induce
guilty plea); Michael 0. Finkelstein, A StatisticalAnalysis of Guilty Plea Practicesin the
Federal Courts, 89 HARv. L. Rv. 293, 309-11 (1975) (theorizing that one-third of
defendants who plea bargain would have been acquitted or had cases dismissed
had case gone to trial); Thau, supra note 112, at 1104-06 (stating that possibility of
innocent defendants' pleading guilty takes collateral estoppel based on guilty pleas
to "the intellectual breaking point"); Vestal, supra note 2, at 341 (noting that "determinative factors" other than guilt may motivate plea bargaining); Arnold S. Jacobs, Note, CollateralEstoppel: Criminal Conviction Based on a Plea of Guilty Declared
Conclusive of Issues in a Subsequent Civil Suit Between the Same Parties;O'Neill v. United
States, 198 F. Supp. 367 (E.D.NY. 1961), 48 CORNELL L.Q. 340, 344 (1963) (stating
that innocent defendants may plead guilty because minor crimes are not worth
defending); Kathleen H. Musslewhite, Comment, The Application of CollateralEstoppel in the Tax FraudContext: Does It Meet the Requirement ofFairnessand Equity?, 33 AM.
U. L. REv. 643, 653, 662 nn.126-31 (1984) (suggesting that pressure on defendant
to plea bargain makes negotiated pleas so unreliable that collateral estoppel of
pleas becomes inappropriate). Judges also encourage guilty pleas by offering leni-
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Second, guilty pleas do not waive defendants' constitutional rights in
subsequent unrelated criminal proceedings.1 40 Although a plea may effectively waive the defendant's constitutional rights in the immediate proceeding, the plea for which the defendant "bargains" does not include
subsequent proceedings. 141 Thus, affording collateral effect to guilty
pleas would undermine the very nature of the plea bargain process, because it is "contrary to the nature of a [plea] bargain to accord it preclu142
sive effect beyond that specifically contained in the agreement."
Third, to grant pleas such an unanticipated and far-reaching preclu143
sive effect would hinder judicial economy by deterring guilty pleas.
ency to defendants. See Thau, supra note 112, at 1104-05 n.147 (citing United States
v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679 (N.D. Ill. 1960) (defending judges' grants of leniency to
defendants that plead guilty)). Many psychological factors also encourage guilty
pleas. See id. at 1105-06 (suggesting that fears of reliving alleged crime, government's coercive power, embarrassing cross-examination or involvement of family
members can influence innocent defendants to plead guilty). In addition, defendants' own counsel may sometimes prod them towards guilty pleas. See id. at 1107
(stating that underpaid defense attorneys may suggest plea as means of avoiding
lengthy trials that "can monopolize a defense attorney's time and foreclose other
lucrative opportunities").
140. Cf Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 22 (stating that defendant, in earlier proceeding, had right to trial by jury and opportunity to contest government's determination of alienage, but that defendant's guilty plea waived such constitutional
fight).
141. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (stating that
guilty plea waives rights to self-incrimination, confrontation of witnesses and right
to jury trial); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (same). These cases,
however, do not mention the waiver of constitutional rights in criminal proceedings after the guilty plea. See, e.g., Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969)
(failing to address collateral estoppel of accused and merely stating that court
must examine with "utmost solicitude" knowledge of defendant entering plea); see
also 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 15, § 611.08 [4] [a] (stating that guilty plea waives
all constitutional objections to [the instant] conviction); Musslewhite, supra note
139, at 645-46 (stating that guilty plea waives rights in current proceeding but is
not intended to forfeit rights in subsequent proceedings).
142. Kennelly, supra note 28, at 1421 (citing GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

§ 7.20, at 280 (2d ed. 1987) (noting significance of

plea bargains' consensual nature)). Kennelly noted that, because pleas constitute
bargains, "if the defendant forgoes her right to a trial in exchange for a specific
charge, it is unfair for the government unilaterally to exact a greater price from
her at a later time." Id. at 1421-22; see LILLY, supra, § 7.20, at 280 (suggesting that
guilty pleas "represent negotiations, concessions, or admissions not intended to
have a conclusive effect beyond the first trial"); 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12,
§ 4443, at 384 (noting that contractual nature of consent judgments mandates that
preclusive effects should be measured by intent of parties) (emphasis added); Collateral and Equitable Estoppel, supra note 10, at 1236 n.101 (conceding that guilty
plea made without knowledge of effects of application of collateral estoppel is not
entered into knowingly).
143. See United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir.
1998) ("The prospect of being collaterally estopped at some future date may discourage criminal defendants from settling criminal charges by pleading guilty.");
see alsoJacobs, supra note 139, at 344-45 (stating that disincentive to enter into
pleas resulting from application of collateral estoppel would hinder judicial economy); Kennelly, supra note 28, at 1421-22 (suggesting that affording guilty pleas
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Collateral estoppel of criminal defendants would also require courts to
satisfy complicated tests before applying the doctrine, thus undermining
any beneficial effects accompanying its use. 14 4 Additionally, federal rules
of evidence that allow evidence of former pleas into evidence further miti145
gate the putative benefits that collateral estoppel would create.
Finally, the suggestion that a "general rule" affords guilty pleas the
same preclusive effect as guilty verdicts in subsequent criminal proceedings has no foundation. 14 6 No such general rule exists. 147 Precedent does
support a rule that guilty pleas and guilty verdicts have the same preclusive
preclusive effect will deter defendants from entering into them). Any action that
would deter guilty pleas would deter judicial economy due to the resulting increased litigation. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATITIcs-1995, at 476 tbl. 5.27 (Kathleen
Maguire & Anne L. Pastore eds., 1995) (showing that 92% of 46,773 federal criminal convictions came from pleas of guilty or nolo contendere).
144. See, e.g., Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1243-44 (stating that collateral estoppel of accused, compounded with Rule l's requirement that guilty pleas be
"knowing," would hinder judicial economy by complicating judicial inquiry into
pleas); United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 635 (11th Cir. 1992) (choosing not
to adopt collateral estoppel test because "it would create more problems than it
was designed to solve" and because "allowing the government to bar a defendant
from relitigating an unfavorable determination of facts in a prior proceeding
would [not] serve the original goal of collateral estoppel-judicial economy").
Allowing collateral estoppel of criminal defendants would also require a determination of whether the defendant's prior counsel had performed effectively. See
Harnage, 976 F.2d at 636 (stating that evaluation of defendant's prior counsel
would require costly evidentiary hearings as well as review of records from prior
proceedings). But see Kennelly, supra note 28, at 1420 (suggesting that defendant
would raise effectiveness of previous counsel had there "been a colorable claim of
ineffective assistance" and that district court would not have to decide issue again
at all).
145. See FED. R. EVID. 401 (1999) (considering only withdrawn pleas inadmissable into evidence in subsequent proceeding); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6)
(discussing inadmissibility of withdrawn pleas); see also LILLY, supra note 142,
§ 7.20, at 278-80 (explaining that federal courts admit into evidence transcript of
prior proceedings containing guilty pleas); 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 15,
§ 611.20[1] (stating that plea of guilty constitutes admission that may be used in
evidence against defendant notwithstanding federal hearsay rules); Kennelly, supra
note 28, at 1422 (arguing that federal hearsay rules undermine any benefits collateral estoppel of accused might create); Collateral and Equitable Estoppel, supra note
10, at 1234-35 (noting that because federal hearsay rules already accomplish similar result as collateral estoppel of guilty plea, doctrine's application would be
redundant).
146. Cf United States v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 83-84 (9th Cir. 1980)
(dictum) (noting general rule that pleas have same preclusive effect as verdicts);
Hernadez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975) (stating that general rule demonstrates that "collateral estoppel, where applicable, applies equally
whether the previous criminal conviction was based on a jury verdict or a plea of
guilty").
147. See, e.g., Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1245 (criticizing Hernandez-Uibe
court for relying on unpersuasive and irrelevant cases that neither support nor
explain court's reasoning).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

29

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 4

700

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44: p. 671

effect in subsequent civil proceedings. 148 But, as the Gallardo-Mendez court
properly noted, precedent does not "support application of the collateral
estoppel doctrine based on a plea of guilty against the defendant in a subsequent, unrelated criminal proceeding." 149 Rather, the long recognized
general rule in civil cases demonstrates that heightened burdens of proof
in subsequent proceedings may preclude the application of the
150
doctrine.
In criminal cases, the standards of proof required for guilty verdicts
and guilty pleas markedly differ.15 1 Rule l's "factual basis" requirement
does not adequately protect defendants from the far-reaching collateral
effects of guilty pleas, in part because it does not require the judge to
inform the defendant of these possible collateral effects. 152 Although
148. See Ivers v. United States, 581 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1978) (applying
collateral estoppel in subsequent civil case based on guilty plea in criminal trial);
Brazzel v. Adams, 493 F.2d 489, 490 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying collateral estoppel
where appellant previously admitted selling heroin); Hyslop v. United States, 261
F.2d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 1959) (using guilty plea to charge of defrauding United
States as proof of transactions in later trial).
149. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1245 (emphasis added).
150. See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362
(1984) ("[I]t is clear that the difference in the relative burdens of proof in the
criminal and civil actions precludes the application of the doctrine of collateral
estoppel."); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397 (1938) (stating that differences in burden of proof may preclude application of doctrine of res judicata in
civil cases); Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1245-46 (discussing courts' refusal to use
collateral estoppel in civil cases due to different burdens of proof); see also 18
MOORE ET AL., supra note 10, §§ 132.04[4] [a], 132.04[4][e] (stating that shifts in
burden of persuasion, even between same parties, can render doctrine inapplicable and stating that collateral estoppel does not apply when party seeking to benefit from collateral estoppel has significantly heavier burden in subsequent action
than in prior action).
151. Compare In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[T]he Due Process
Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."), with FED. R. CRiM. P. 11 (f) (requiring court to determine that defendant enters knowing plea), and Hernandez-Uribe, 515 F.2d at 22 (stating that court
must satisfy itself that "factual basis" exists for guilty plea); see also United States v.
Alber, 56 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that courts accepting guilty pleas
need not be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt); United
States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 111-12 (6th Cir. 1995) (stating that strong evidence
of guilt is not requisite for entering guilty plea); United States v. Marks, 38 F.3d
1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 1994) (stating that court need only be reasonably convinced
defendant committed crime in order to enter guilty plea); United States v. Fountain, 777 F.2d 351, 357 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that only some factual basis is required for entering guilty plea).
152. See 24 MOORE ET AL., supra note 15, § 611.06[4] [d] n.34 (noting that
Rule 11 does not require judge to inform defendant of all collateral consequences
of plea); Thau, supra note 112, at 1116 (stating that competent attorneys should
"[a]t a minimum" warn clients of possible application of collateral estoppel because judges have no such obligation) (citing Gray v. United States, 663 F.2d 1071
(6th Cir. 1981) (holding that federal judge need not inform defendant proffering
guilty plea of possible application of collateral estoppel in subsequent civil proceeding for fraud, because collateral estoppel is collateral rather than direct conse-
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Rule 11 may protect the accused in the immediate proceeding, it does not
justify according preclusive effect of that plea in an infinite number of
subsequent proceedings. 153 Moreover, a fact determined by a plea may
not have been sufficiently "adjudicated" to support the application of collateral estoppel. 15 4 The next logical step for the collateral estoppel doctrine, therefore, would preclude collateral estoppel of criminal defendants
155
based on previous guilty pleas.
5.

The Sixth Amendment Precludes CollateralEstoppel of the Accused

Perhaps recognizing the vulnerability of their rationale, those circuits
that allow collateral estoppel of the accused ignore the constitutional implications of their holdings.1 56 Several arguments, however, demonstrate
quence of plea)); Musslewhite, supra note 139, at 656 ("Neither the judge nor the
prosecutor, however, is required to inform the defendant of possible collateral
consequences of his plea."); see also Gray v. Commissioner, 708 F.2d 243, 245 n.4
(6th Cir. 1983) (stating that "courts have held that the defendant need not be
advised of collateral consequences of his plea"); United States v. Myers, 451 F.2d
402, 404 (9th Cir. 1972) (stating that court need not inform defendant of every
consequence of entering plea); cf Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699, 701 (9th
Cir. 1964) (requiring defendant's attorney to inform defendant of collateral consequences of guilty plea). See generally Musslewhite, supra note 139, at 655-58 (criticizing protections of Rule 11 that are intended to prevent prosecutorial abuse). In
addition, some judges fail to satisfy the spirit of Rule 11. See Thau, supranote 112,
at 1108 (noting that, due to federal docket congestion and valuation of judges
based on turnover, few judges will probe merits of guilty pleas if neither prosecution nor defense does so).
153. See Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1245-46 (concluding that Rule 11's "factual basis" requirement cannot satisfy due process requirement that government
prove essential elements of charge "beyond a reasonable doubt" in successive, unrelated criminal proceeding); see also Murray, supra note 12, at 935 (stating that
different burdens of proof make transportation of collateral estoppel from civil to
criminal cases problematic).
154. See Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d at 1246 ("We conclude [that Rule 1l's] 'factual basis' requirement cannot satisfy the due process requirement that the government prove the essential elements of the charge 'beyond a reasonable doubt' in a
successive, unrelated criminal proceeding."); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 10,
§ 85 cmt. b (advocating precluding use of collateral estoppel when conviction is
derived from guilty plea because issue has not been adjudicated); 18 MOORE ET AL.,
supra note 10, § 132.02 [2] [1] [ii] (stating that facts determined by admission or
stipulation in civil case are not entitled to preclusive effect because such facts have
not been litigated); lB JAMES WM. MooRE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACrICE
0.418[1] (2d ed. 1983) (analogizing to impropriety of giving preclusive effect to
civil admissions and concluding that collateral estoppel is inapplicable to guilty
pleas because issue has been neither litigated nor adjudicated).
155. Cf Currie, supra note 119, at 289 (warning that extending "dangerous
instrument" of collateral estoppel by "merely logical processes of manipulation"
may produce results abhorrent to justice and order).
156. See generally Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 22 (failing to address constitutional issues); Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1968) (addressing whether judgment in criminal case may collaterally estop criminal
defendant, but failing to consider constitutional issue). This failure has not gone
unnoticed. See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 894 (3d Cir. 1994) (criticizing earlier courts' failures to "conduct a constitutional analysis" by instead rely-
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that their holdings conflict with basic due process guarantees. For example, collateral estoppel of the accused interferes with the defendant's pre1 57
sumption of innocence and right to confront adverse witnesses.
Furthermore, the Framers would not approve of collateral estoppel of the
accused because they guaranteed criminal defendants the right to a trial
by jury, but merely "preserved" that right for civil litigants as it existed at
the Bill of Rights' ratification.15 8 Thus, the stronger right to a jury in
59
criminal cases supports precluding collateral estoppel of the accused.'
Construing the Constitution as precluding collateral estoppel of the ac-

ing on their perception of public policy for holdings); Collateral and Equitable

Estoppel, supra note 10, at 1228 (noting that cases allowing collateral estoppel of
accused leave unresolved whether doing so abridges fundamental rights); Collateral
Estoppel Against the Accused, supra note 20, at 516, 524 (stating that collateral estoppel of accused raises serious policy and constitutional issues that courts which allow
collateral estoppel have failed to adequately address).
157. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 892 (citing favorably line of cases holding that government's use of offensive collateral estoppel against criminal defendants conflicts
with presumption of innocence); CollateralEstoppel Against the Accused, supra note
20, at 521 n.50 (suggesting that collateral estoppel of accused may violate defendant's right to presumption of innocence); Murray, supra note 12, at 936 (stating
that estoppel of accused may "violate the presumption of his innocence and right
to jury trial"). Collateral estoppel of criminal defendants also infringes on the
right to confront adverse witnesses. See CollateralEstoppel Against the Accused, supra
note 20, at 521-22 (noting that right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses casts doubt on constitutionality of collateral estoppel of accused).
158. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law ... the right
of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . ."), with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cf. 3 ("The
trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury."), and U.S.
CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ."). The differences in language between the two contemporaneous Amendments indicate that the Framers
intended that they have different effects. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 894-95 (noting that
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of rights is stronger than Seventh Amendment's
mere preservation of rights as they existed at time of ratification of Bill of Rights).
For example, the use of obligatory language in the Sixth Amendment and Article
III demonstrates that the Framers intended to create an absolute right to a trial by
jury in all criminal proceedings. See id. (stating that language of Sixth Amendment
makes clear that right to jury trial is absolute in every criminal proceeding). Furthermore, although no case has yet to consider it, the different scopes of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments also indicate that the Constitution anticipates collateral
estoppel of the prosecution but not of the accused. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V
(extending right to trial by jury to "accused" only), with U.S. CONST. amend. VI
(guaranteeing right to trial by jury to both parties to "civil trials").
159. See Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 895 (noting that Seventh Amendment merely "preserved" right to jury trial as it existed at common law at Amendment's ratification,
but Sixth Amendment guaranteed "right" to trial by impartial jury); see also Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (holding that fundamentality of Sixth
Amendment requires its incorporation into Due Process Clause of Fourtheenth
Amendment); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 34 (1965) (stating that defendant cannot waive jury trial without government's consent); Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 895
(noting absence in criminal cases of mechanism similar to motion for directed

verdict or summary judgment in civil cases).
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cused accords with the dicta of many federal courts. 160 In addition, the
chronology of the circuit court decisions demonstrates a trend to so
hold.16 1 The Tenth Circuit, therefore, wisely rejected collateral estoppel
of the accused in favor of an approach that does not offend fundamental
162
policies of criminal jurisprudence.
6.

Conclusion

The decision in Gallardo-Mendez achieves the necessary balance between policy concerns and constitutional requirements.1 6 3 The limited
and dubious benefits of allowing collateral estoppel of the accused do not
164
Ultioutweigh the certain constitutional conflicts that its use creates.
160. See, e.g., United States v. DeAngelo, 138 F.2d 466, 468 (3d Cir. 1943)
("An accused is constitutionally entitled to a trial de novo of the facts alleged
against and offered in support of each offense charged against him and to a jury's
independent finding with respect thereto."); United States v. Panetta, 436 F. Supp.

114, 122-23 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (dictum) (noting that collateral estoppel of accused
resembles partially directed verdict of guilty), aff'd without op., 568 F.2d 771 (3d
Cir. 1978); United States v. Bruno, 333 F. Supp. 570, 576 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("An
accused is always constitutionally entitled to a trial de novo of the facts alleged and
offered in support of each offense charged against him, and collateral estoppel is
available as a defense even though it can never be raised offensively by the prosecution."); Gutierrez v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 386-87 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that attempted murder conviction did not estop issues of intent
and identity in subsequent trial for murder of same victim); State v. Stiefel, 256 So.
2d 581, 585 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (dictum) (suggesting that criminal defendants may have juries to try all elements of each charge); Rouse v. State, 97 A.2d
285, 289 (Md. 1953) (suggesting that collateral estoppel of accused interferes with
states burden of proving elements beyond reasonable doubt); State v. Thomas, 276
A.2d 391, 397 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1971) (dictum) (suggesting that government's collateral estoppel of accused makes its burden to prove each element of

offense nugatory).
161. Compare United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th
Cir. 1998) (precluding collateral estoppel of accused), Pellulo, 14 F.3d at 896 ("[A]
right to ajury trial necessitates that every jury empaneled for a prosecution considers evidence of guilt afresh ...

."),

and United States v. Harnage, 976 F.2d 633, 636

(11th Cir. 1992) (refusing to use doctrine on grounds of judicial economy), with
Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 22 (allowing collateral estoppel of accused), and PenaCabanillas,394 F.2d at 787-88 (allowing collateral estoppel of accused).
162. See Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 117, at 31 n.158 (suggesting that
collateral estoppel of accused conflicts with jury-trial and confrontation clauses of
Sixth Amendment); Collateral Estoppel Against the Accused, supra note 20, at 521-24
(stating that constitutional protections preclude governments collateral estoppel
of accused); CollateralandEquitableEstoppel, supra note 10, at 1237-42 (same); Collateral Estoppel in Criminal Cases, supra note 12, at 276-77 ("[D]ue process requires that
the defendant be guaranteed a trial as to each issue of fact in every prosecution.");
Murray, supra note 12, at 935-36 (stating that transplanting collateral estoppel
from civil to criminal arena would be impossible because of different burdens of
proof and lack of mutuality in criminal cases).
163. For a discussion of the effects of collateral estoppel of the accused on
judicial economy, see supra notes 106-18, 143-45 and accompanying text.
164. For a discussion of the constitutional argument in favor of collateral estoppel of the accused, as well as the judicial administration arguments in favor of
it, see supra notes 106-118, 156-62 and accompanying text.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

33

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1999], Art. 4
704

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44: p. 671

mately, wise public policy and common sense judicial administration do
not combine to advocate a policy of ignoring the intemporal constitu1 65
tional guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.
V.

IMPACT: BEYOND United States v. Gallardo-Mendez

The Gallardo-Mendezdecision, although properly decided, does not resolve the split among the circuit courts. 166 That the holdings of the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits remain extant seriously threatens the constitutional rights of all criminal defendants within those circuits. 167 Additionally, the growing need to reduce the federal docket backlog and expedite
1 68
illegal immigrant proceedings will tempt other circuits to follow suit.
This temptation will weigh heavily on courts that have traditionally considered collateral estoppel an acceptable means of achieving judicial

economy.169
Courts should not, despite urging to the contrary, capriciously constrict criminal defendants' constitutional rights. 170 The Supreme Court
should resolve this split because any precedent that unnecessarily circumscribes the Sixth Amendment may ultimately provide another court with
precedential support for applying collateral estoppel against all criminal
165. For a discussion of the Sixth Amendment issues implicated by collateral
estoppel of the accused, see supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of the circuit split, see supranote 16 and accompanying
text.
167. See Hernandez-Uribe v. United States, 515 F.2d 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1975)
(allowing government to collaterally estop criminal defendants based on guilty
pleas in previous criminal adjudications); Pena-Cabanillas v. United States, 394
F.2d 785, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1968) (allowing government to collaterally estop criminal defendants). For a further discussion of how these decisions threaten the constitutional rights of criminal defendants within those circuits, see supra notes 34-52
and accompanying text.
168. See VEsTAL, supra note 12, at v-10 to 11 (noting that policy of promoting
judicial economy has taken on added significance in modern courts that face
docket congestion and overburdened judges); Vestal, supra note 2, at 281 (noting
that overwhelming work loads give courts additional incentive to use collateral estoppel to foreclose repetitive litigation of issues). Federal courts will continue to
confront this issue due to the particularity with which federal criminal statutes are
written. See, e.g., United States v. Gallardo-Mendez, 150 F.3d 1240, 1242 n.2 (10th
Cir. 1998) (demonstrating that statutory federal criminal laws facilitate determination of crimes' essential elements); Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 117, at 29
(noting that tendency of legislatures towards specificity in drafting of statutory offenses has contributed to expansion of collateral estoppel in criminal law).
169. See, e.g., 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 4403, at 11-22 (stating that
collateral estoppel serves goals of promoting judicial and litigant economy). For a
further discussion of judicial economy as a traditional goal of collateral estoppel,
see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., Kennelly, supra note 28, at 1383-84, 1422 (stating that collateral
estoppel of accused does not substantially conflict with constitutional protections
in alienage proceedings). For a further discussion of the arguments in favor of
collateral estoppel of the accused, see supranotes 18-33 and 53-60 and accompanying text.
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defendants. Resolving this split on constitutional grounds would also create uniformity among state courts. 171 Should the Supreme Court fail to
rule on this issue, federal courts in at least two circuits will continue to
encroach upon the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, tempting
172
other circuits to follow their lead.
Michael P. Daly

171. See Mayer & Yarbrough, supra note 117, at 39 (stating that constitutional
ruling on collateral estoppel of accused would be relevant only for holding's effect
on previous cases or as block to legislative attempts); Vestal, supra note 2, at 284
(stating that holdings based on due process or double jeopardy grounds are binding on state courts, while those based on mere administration of justice are not).
Federal decisions based merely on the administration of justice within the court
system, although persuasive, have no binding effect of state courts because states
enjoy power to control their own administration in absence of overriding federal
constitutional considerations. See Vestal, supra note 2, at 284 n.32 (noting that
federal rules of mutuality of estoppel, which are based on administrative rather
than constitutional grounds, do not bind state courts). See generally Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that Court is supreme in
constitutional interpretation because of need to provide uniform interpretation of
federal questions).
172. See Hernandez-Uribe,515 F.2d at 22 (holding that prosecution may use
guilty plea as collateral estoppel against accused); Pena-Cabanillas,394 F.2d at 787
(same).
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